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CONSTITUTIONALISM UNDER CHINESE




With nearly two years having passed since the founding of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) it is a good time to
assess Hong Kong's constitutional and human rights prospects. The
1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration set Hong Kong aside for a unique
Chinese experiment with the fundamentals of modern liberal constitu-
tional government.' In the 1984 agreement providing for the return of
Hong Kong to China, Hong Kong was promised democracy, human
rights and the rule of law, along with a "high degree of autonomy" un-
der China's "one country, two systems" formula. 2 With the July 1997
handover, after thirteen years of preparation, the final phase of exe-
cuting this agreement commenced. The people of Hong Kong and the
world are watching to see if China's solemn commitments to set up a
regime of liberal human rights and democracy within an authoritarian
national system are carried out. While the transfer of sovereignty in
Hong Kong on July 1, 1997 went relatively smoothly, tension between
real power, reflected in China's perceived national imperatives, and the
aspirations of liberal constitutionalism and autonomy remain and will
shape the Hong Kong constitutional experiment. This tension is ex-
amined in the current essay.
The Hong Kong project highlights the demanding task of con-
* Professor of Law, Chinese University of Hong Kong (mcdavis@cuhk.edu.hk). A special
thanks to Thomas Eldert for his excellent research assistance. A further thanks for the
benefit of comments given in regard to earlier versions of this article presented as a ple-
nary talk at the World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Seoul,
South Korea, August 1997 and for a round-table panel at the Annual Meeting of the Asso-
ciation of Asian Studies, Washington, DC, March, 1998.
1. Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question
of Hong Kong, Sept. 26, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1371 , UK-PRC [hereinafter Joint Declaration].
The promises of the Joint Declaration were stipulated in Article 3 (12) to be included in
the HKSAR's constitution, the Basic Law. Id. at 1372.
2. Id. at 1371; People's Republic of China: the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region of the Peoples' Republic of China, Apr. 4, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1511,
1529 [hereinafter Basic Law].
275
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POLY
structing an adequate regime to secure autonomy and liberal human
rights in a hostile national environment. In this regard, it is important
to note that the nature of that national environment has changed from
that envisioned in the Joint Declaration. The original design of the
Joint Declaration seemed fundamentally concerned with the theoreti-
cally worthy task of separating a local liberal capitalist system from a
Marxist national system. The advent of the free market in China means
this project now may simply distinguish an authoritarian capitalist sys-
tem on the mainland from an aspiring liberal capitalist or even soft-
authoritarian one in Hong Kong.
The success of Hong Kong's model will have enormous implications
for both Hong Kong and China. A successful Hong Kong, under the
commitments in the Sino-British Joint Declaration, would alone be a
sufficient basis for this demanding constitutional effort. However, it is
important to remember that this success will not only work to China's
economic benefit, but may also afford a laboratory for China's ongoing
political reform process. The Joint Declaration will certainly raise the
high water mark for securing the benefits of human rights, liberty and
democracy in Chinese society. Hong Kong's money and its rule of law,
as well as its political and social values, are already traveling across the
very porous Sino-Hong Kong border. Viewed internationally, Hong
Kong is a major player in the global economic order and will be watched
by its many trading partners. They will be watching to see if Hong Kong
is a truly autonomous open community, which can be relied upon in the
conduct of external relations. This is the high hope of the Hong Kong
promise and of Hong Kong's service to China.
This essay consists of three substantial parts. The first part ad-
dresses the basic constitutional order and its evolving commitments. Af-
ter concluding that the Sino-British Joint Declaration includes a com-
mitment to liberal constitutionalism, this part assesses the health of
three key liberal constitutional elements, including sections on democ-
racy, human rights and the rule of law. Both the Hong Kong Basic Law
and subsequent transition and post-handover policies and practices are
addressed. The remaining parts of this essay offer analysis of two key
areas of concern, or what might be considered the main challenges fac-
ing Hong Kong in the implementation of its promised liberal constitu-
tional order. These include the emergence of a competing political
model evident in a "Singaporean" vision for Hong Kong, and the chal-
lenges associated with autonomy. The first of these relates to an eco-
nomic paradigm, offered in competition to the liberal one discussed
herein, that may animate current government policies and undermine
this constitutional commitment. The final part analyzes the constitu-
tional politics of autonomy, both in terms of Hong Kong's domestic rela-
tionship with China and its international personality.
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II. THE BASIC CONSTITUTIONAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITMENTS
The 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration, in addition to providing
for the return of Hong Kong to China in 1997, essentially promised
Hong Kong a future with a liberal constitutional order and a high de-
gree of autonomy under the Basic Law. 3 As a general proposition, the
basic structural elements of liberal constitutionalism are thought to in-
clude (1) democracy with multi-party competition, (2) liberal human
rights protection, including freedom of speech, and (3) the rule of law,
including adherence to principles of legality.4 With the exception of
some limitations on the level of democracy, the Joint Declaration
promises all of these elements. In 1984, it was understood that any-
thing less would fail to secure adequate confidence in Hong Kong's fu-
ture. At that time a substantial portion of Hong Kong's people had es-
caped from the brutality of totalitarian communism, and the Chinese
leaders themselves had just escaped the national trauma of the Cul-
tural Revolution. While the Joint Declaration is general in character, it
leaves little interpretive space for vitiating the liberal capitalist inten-
tions of its drafters. 5 While the Chinese leaders may have been naive
about the political implications of the great social experiments embod-
ied in their open policy at home and in their Hong Kong policy, they left
little ambiguity as to the nature of their Hong Kong commitment.
Their commitment was for liberal constitutional government. Respect-
ing democracy, the Joint Declaration promises that the Chief executive
is to be chosen by "elections or consultations" held locally and that the
legislature is to be chosen by "elections." 6 Regarding human rights, the
Joint Declaration lists the full panoply of liberal rights, of which more
than half relate to freedom of expression.7 It also guarantees the appli-
cation of the international human rights covenants. 8 The rule of law is
expressly secured by the continued application of the common law, the
independence and finality of the local courts, the supremacy of the Ba-
sic Law (which is stipulated to include the content of the Joint Declara-
tion), and the right to challenge executive actions in the courts, which
presumably includes the right to challenge the actions legal basis under
the Basic Law.9 By implication, this promised nothing less than a full
system of constitutional judicial review to enforce a substantial bill of
3. Joint Declaration, supra note 1, at 1371-75.
4. See ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY & ITS CRITICS 223 (1989).
5. See generally Joint Declaration, supra note 1.
6. See id. at para. 3(4) & Annex I, art. I.
7. See id. at para. 3(5) & Annex I, art. XIII.
8. Id.
9. Id. at para. 3(3), (5), (12), & Annex I, arts. I-III, XIII.
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rights. In tandem with a degree of democracy and a high degree of
autonomy, the Joint Declaration committed China to liberal constitu-
tional government in Hong Kong.
The HKSAR Basic Law, enacted in 1990, lives up to these commit-
ments in many respects but falls ambiguously short in others. 10 As a
constitutional document, the Basic Law is the product of an extraordi-
nary five year drafting process.11 After multiple drafts and endless dis-
cussions a constitutional road map for the future HKSAR took shape.
While these discussions, engaged a wide range of ideas, Chinese offi-
cials did seek to constrain the outcome. They were cautious about
democratic development from the start.12 But at the final stage, before
approving the final Basic Law in April 1990, the 1989 Tiananmen dem-
onstrations in Beijing and the enormous supporting demonstrations in
Hong Kong left their mark. Although many key provisions were already
finalized in the February 1989 final draft 13 and remained unaffected by
Tiananmen, the 1989 demonstrations in Hong Kong shifted the para-
digm of China's Hong Kong policy from protecting Hong Kong from
China to the other way around.
China's basic political instincts to maximize control and this "Tian-
anmen effect" combined to produce the conservative Hong Kong policy
evident in the final Basic Law and China's transition practices. Both in
the Basic Law and in subsequent transition policies, a degree of erosion
from the Joint Declaration commitments has occurred. The following
sections consider each of the key liberal constitutional components dis-
cussed above as they have emerged in the Basic Law, the transition
process, and the post-handover politics of the first couple years of Chi-
nese rule.
A. Democracy
The erosion of the Joint Declaration commitments is especially evi-
dent with regard to democracy, where the Tiananmen effect was most
pronounced. The relevant provisions respecting democracy were not fi-
nalized in the first draft of the Basic Law published in 1988.14 The
10. Basic Law, supra note 2, at 1520-50.
11. This process included China's appointment of a 180-member Basic Law Consulta-
tive Committee (all Hong Kong residents), and a 58-member Basic Law Drafting Commit-
tee (of which 23 members were Hong Kong residents). Id at 1511.
12. See MICHAEL C. DAVIS, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFRONTATION IN HONG KONG, ISSUES
AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE BASIC LAW, 28-29 (1989) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL
CONFRONTATION].
13. The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's
Republic of China (Draft)) [hereinafter Draft Basic Law], reprinted in DAVIS,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFRONTATION, supra note 12, at 175-215.
14. DAVIS, supra note 12, at 28-29.
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1989 Draft Basic Law then adopted a very conservative model.' 5 After
the 1989 demonstrations, as Chinese leaders worried about Hong Kong
becoming a base of subversion, they sought to tighten the noose on de-
mocracy, insisting on retaining this very conservative evolutionary
model in the final Basic Law. 16 This model, respecting the election of
the first post-handover Legislative Council, allows the sixty-member
body to have only twenty directly-elected geographical seats, ten Selec-
tion Committee seats and thirty functional constituency seats (from
various professional and commercial sectors). 17 It is noteworthy that
this figure was worked out with the British as part of a convergence
plan to allow for the pre-handover Legislative Council to have only
eighteen such directly elected geographical seats in 1991 and twenty in
1995. With convergence, it was anticipated that those elected in 1995
would remain in office through 1997 until 1999.18 For the second and
third term, under the Basic Law, there will be an evolutionary process
expanding the number of directly elected geographical seats to thirty
(along with thirty functional seats) by 2004.19 For the period after 2007
a two-thirds contingent of the Legislative Council and the Chief Execu-
tive can amend the Basic Law providing for greater democracy in elec-
tion of the Legislative Council.20 The Chief Executive, after the first ap-
pointment, is to be selected by an 800 member Election Committee.21
The Basic Law declares that the "ultimate aim is . . . universal suf-
frage."22 By the late drafting stage as the leading democrats were
eliminated from the post-Tiananmen process finalizing the Basic Law,
this conservative model was adopted with little resistance. 23
15. See Draft Basic Law, supra note 13, at Annexes I and II.
16. Basic Law, supra note 2, at Annexes I and II.
17. Basic Law, supra note 2, at Annex II; Decision of the National People's Congress
on the Method for the Formation of the First Government and the First Legislative Coun-
cil of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, adopted at the Third Session of the
Seventh National People's Congress on 4 April 1990, 1550-51 [hereinafter First Govern-
ment Decision].
18. Id.
19. Basic Law, supra note 2, at Annexes I and II.
20. Basic Law, supra note 2, at Annex II.
21. Id. at Annex I. The process for electing the Election Committee, largely through
functional constituencies, insures that conservative business and pro-China forces will
hold the controlling vote.
22. Id. at arts. 45, 68.
23. Martin C. M. Lee and Szeto Wah, the two leading democratic activists of the
1980s, served on both the Basic Law drafting and consultative committees. After leading
more than a million demonstrators under the banner of the Alliance in Support of the
Democratic Patriotic Movement in China in 1989, after the June 4, 1989 Beijing massa-
cre, they withdrew from these Basic Law committees. They attempted to resume their
positions when the temporarily suspended drafting process resumed in late 1989 but they
were refused entry. See Chronology of Major Events in PRECARIOUS BALANCE: HONG
KONG BETWEEN CHINA AND BRITAIN, 1842-1992 209-211 (Ming K. Chan ed., 1994) [here-
inafter Chronology].
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Any hope that democratic forces can use their foothold to expand
democracy is also tightly controlled by other provisions in the Basic
Law. Not only is there the two-thirds vote requirement to institute full
universal suffrage after 2007, but there are a plethora of other con-
straints on democracy. 24 As the Legislative Council is to take the lead
in democratization, these constraints mostly relate to legislative pow-
ers. 25 For example, for local legislative action members of the Legisla-
tive Council are required to get the Chief Executive's approval before
they can introduce bills involving expenditure or government policy. 26
Additionally, amendments to government bills and motions or bills in-
troduced by individual members of the Legislative Council require ma-
jority approval by each of two different groups of legislators: thirty from
functional constituencies and thirty made up of members directly
elected from geographical constituencies, and those chosen by the Elec-
tion Committee. 27 As if this obstacle course for democratic initiative
were not enough, the government argued, in challenging the newly en-
acted Rules of Procedure of the first post-handover elected Legislative
Council, that even amendments to government bills, proposed by legis-
lators, require the Chief Executive's approval. 28 The chance of avoiding
these constraints through amendment of the Basic Law is also blocked.
The power to amend the Basic Law is vested in the National People's
Congress (NPC).29 Even the submission of local proposals for amend-
ments requires a two-thirds vote in the Legislative Council, the consent
of two-thirds of the local NPC deputies, and the approval of the Chief
Executive.
30
After promulgating the Basic Law in 1990, China's policy of resist-
ing democracy persisted in the 1990s processes of transition and in
post-handover politics. By the early 1990s, influenced by the initiation
of direct election for eighteen geographical seats to the Legislative
Council in 1991, Hong Kong, under colonial rule, began to develop a
democratic political system, with numerous political parties across a
broad spectrum, an informed public and a vibrant press attuned to po-
litical coverage. 31 In October 1992 the then new Hong Kong Governor,
Chris Patten, put forth a controversial proposal for the last British
24. Basic Law, supra note 2, at art. 74 and Annex II.
25. Id.
26. Basic Law, supra note 2, at art. 74.
27. Id. at Annex II.
28. Angela Li, Justice Chief to Challenge Bill in Court; To Apply a Judicial Review
Shows Disrespect for the Legislature's Unanimous Decision, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
July 8, 1998, at 6; Margaret Ng, Restrictions Will Clip Legco's Wings, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, July 17, 1998, at 17.
29. Basic Law, supra note 2, at art. 159.
30. Id.
31. It is noteworthy that, Martin Lee and Szeto Wah, after leading the protest in
1989, went on to form and lead the political parties (now the Democratic Party) which
won the most popular votes in the elections at various levels held in the 1990s.
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Hong Kong election in 1995.32 This proposal aimed to further
strengthen the foundation for democratic political development by
maximizing the space allowed by the Basic Law electoral ratio.33 His
proposal allowed for nine appointed seats from the 1991 Legislative
Council to be replaced by broad-based functional constituencies that in-
cluded all working voters.34 It further provided that the Selection
Committee, anticipated in the Basic Law, for selecting ten seats in the
first post-handover Legislative Council, be made up of directly elected
members of the district and regional boards. 35 This substantially broad-
ened the franchise for two-thirds of the seats in the Legislative Council.
Chinese officials attacked this proposal aggressively. 36  They
seemed set to exclude certain elected democrats, who had been active in
the 1989 demonstrations, from the 1997 through-train. 37 After failing
to resolve the ensuing impasse through. seventeen rounds of negotia-
tions, both sides decided to go it alone. 38 The Patten proposal was en-
acted and followed in the 1995 election, setting the high point, to date,
32. The Right Honorable Governor Christopher Patten, Our Next Five Years, The
Agenda for Hong Kong, Address at the Opening of the 1992/93 Session of the Legislative
Council (Oct. 7, 1992).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. His proposal expanded elections and eliminated appointed seats to various sub-
Legislative Council district boards and regional councils. These elected bodies then made
up his Selection Committee for the selection of ten legislators, as specified in China's
transition legislation. By matching China's basic formula Patton hoped his full Legislative
Council would ride on the through-train to serve beyond the 1997 handover. There was
an interesting development after the handover, in addition to eliminating the Board
members prominent electoral role in the Legislative Council, China's Hong Kong govern-
ment re-introduced into Hong Kong Government some appointed seats to district boards
and even abolished one level of councils. Angela Li, Five Walk Out as Appointed Seats
Secure Approval, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 11, 1999, at 6.
36. See Representative Government in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Government Printer,
1994)(reproducing the text of the White Paper presented to Parliament by the Secretary
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by Command of Her Majesty on 24 Feb-
ruary 1994) (representing the British account of the negotiations and their breakdown)
[hereinafter Representative Government in Hong Kong]; UK Accused of Breaching Trust
By Leaking Confidential Details, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 1, 1994, at 12-13 (con-
taining China's report on the breakdown of negotiations).
37. Democratic party members Martin Lee and Szeto Wah were excluded from the
Basic Law drafting and consultative committees. Both had led the 1989 demonstrations
in Hong Kong and were founders of the alliance in support of the Patriotic Democratic
Movement In China, which China has branded as subversive. Chronology, supra note 23,
at 208-10. In the course of the 1993 Sino-British negotiations over elections, Chinese offi-
cials repeatedly proposed a review formula that would allow them to exclude both Mr. Lee
and Mr. Szeto from the through-train. See Representative Government in Hong Kong,
supra note 36; UK Accused of Breaching the Trust by Leaking Confidential Details, supra
note 36.
38. Representative Government in Hong Kong, supra note 36; Linda Choy, Calls to
Release Minutes for Fair Analysis, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 1, 1994, at 4.
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for democracy in Hong Kong. 39
Objecting to the British Hong Kong actions, China started to roll
back these democratic developments. 40 China created a "second stove"
by appointing its' supporters to a large number of transition bodies. 41
These appointed bodies included several local advisory groups, and ul-
timately, for the transition process, a Preliminary Working Committee
and its successor, the Preparatory Committee.42 The Preparatory
Committee was charged with several transition functions, including the
selection of a 400 member Selection Committee. 43 This Selection Com-
mittee then chose both the first Chief Executive and a Provisional Leg-
islature. 44 The appointed Provisional Legislature, took office on July 1,
1997 and remained in power until April of 1998. The Provisional Leg-
islature was never mentioned in the Basic Law or the transition legis-
lation, concurrently enacted by the National People's Congress (NPC),
which specifies the electoral make-up of the first HKSAR Legislative
Council.45 Though it survived a judicial challenge raised immediately
after the handover, the Provisional Legislature appeared to clearly vio-
late the NPC transition legislation's specific electoral requirements and
the more general requirement that the legislature be chosen through
elections, specified in both the Basic Law and the Joint Declaration. 46
During its one year tenure, the Provisional Legislature enacted the
electoral law, under which the current Legislative Council was elected
39. See Jubilant Democrats Eye Legco, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 7, 1995, at 1.
Fung Wai-Kong and Lok Wong, Democrats Dominate Legco, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Sept. 19, 1995, at 1.
40. Representative Government in Hong Kong, supra note 36; UKAccused of Breach-
ing the Trust by Leaking Confidential Details, supra note 36.
41. Beijing Names New Advisers, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 26, 1999, at 1.
42. Chris Yeung, Players in the Power Game, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 2, 1995,
at 17.
43. Id.
44. Incumbent and Legco Losers Win Selection Fight; Qian's Pointer to Smooth Tran-
sition in Martin Lee's 'darkest day' since '89, While Governor Sickens, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Dec. 22, 1996, at 1; Chris Yeung, The Obligations of Office, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Dec. 14, 1998, at 21; Chris Yeung & Linda Choy, Tung Leads The Way; 'We are Fi-
nally Masters of Our Own House . . . We Must Put Aside Our Differences and Find Com-
mon Ground to Build Hong Kong Together', S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 12, 1996, at 1.
45. First Government Decision, supra note 18.
46. Since the court held that the Basic Law preserved the law in question, being
challenged by a criminal defendant, without need of the Reunification Ordinance, the
ruling upholding the legality of the Provisional Legislature was orbiter dicta. HKSAR v.
Ma Wai Kwan David & Ors, Court of Appeal, No. 1, 1997 330-31. See also Cliff Buddle,
Handover Body Facing New Court Test; Appeal Judges Ready to Review Landmark Rul-
ing on Validity of Provisional Legislature, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 6, 1998, at 8;
Cliff Buddle, Same Judges to Hear New Challenge to Legislature, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Feb. 19, 1998, at 5; Margaret Ng, Decision that Resonates, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Aug. 8, 1997, at 19.
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on May 24, 1998.4 7 The electoral method for this election was an ex-
tremely conservative version of the post-handover model specified in the
Basic Law, and the NPC Decision respecting the first government, con-
sisting of thirty functional constituency seats, ten Selection Committee
seats and twenty directly elected geographical seats.48 This conserva-
tive quality was evident in the narrowing of the nine functional con-
stituencies that Chris Patten's model had broadened to include all
working voters; functional constituencies were considerably narrowed,
such that only 230,000 voters from elite sectors made up the potential
size of the functional constituencies. 49 The Selection Committee, to fill
ten seats, required that the 400 members be selected by approximately
140,000 functional constituency voters, plus other designated local and
national political figures. 50 The twenty directly elected geographical
seats were structured through a proportional representation scheme to
limit the role of the democratic camp in the Legislative Council.5 1 The
directly elected seats were formerly based on one seat, one vote districts
where the candidate with the most votes prevailed.5 2 The new model
provides for three to five seat districts with one vote per voter, and then
employs a complex formula to distribute the seats to ensure some seats
for less popular candidates. 53 The end result is a government made up
of an appointed Chief Executive and a Legislative Council where an
elite minority of about 230,000 individual and corporate voters select
two thirds of the legislators.5 4 In this model the electoral process seems
to have considerably drifted from the Joint Declaration's liberal prom-
ises.
47. Legis. Council Ordinance, CAP 542 (Sept. 28, 1997).
48. Id. at arts. 19, 21 and 23.
49. Linda Choy & Chris Yeung, Uneven Response as Voter Drive Ends, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Jan. 17, 1998, at 1. Registration of 2.77 million geographical voters (70%
of those eligible) and 148,000 functional individual and group voters (about 60% of those
eligible) occurred. No Kwai-Yan, 290,000 New Voters Register in Campaign, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Jan. 18, 1998, at 4.
50. Week-long Nominations for Poll Body Set to Begin, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar.
9, 1998, at 6.
51. Quinton Chan & Linda Choy, 'List Voting' Lets Candidates Run as Independents,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 9, 1997, at 8; Greater Uncertainty for Key Candidates, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 2, 1998, at 6.
52. Margaret Ng, Democrats the Losers in Tung's Game Plan, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Sept. 19, 1997, at 29; Fung Wai-Kong, Pro-China Party Leader Calls for Propor-
tional Representation, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 17, 1997, at 1.
53. In addition to favoring less popular pro-China candidates, this system has had
the effect of pitting pro-democracy candidates, both from different parties and within the
same party, against each other. Historic Poll a Fight Among Friends Revamped Multi-
Seat Battlegrounds Pit Allies Against Each Other in Scramble for Votes, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Feb. 23, 1998, at 6.
54. The use of corporate votes in functional constituencies has been cited as a poten-
tial source of abuse of this functional system, with some in the Real Estate and Construc-
tion sector being accused of setting up shelf companies which become corporate voters.
Gren Manuel, Tycoons Buy Extra Ballots, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 22, 1998, at 2.
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The design of this model seemed clearly aimed at keeping the
democratic camp in the minority; it successfully accomplished its' mis-
sion. With a relatively high voter turnout of fifty-three percent, the
various democrats, including members of three parties and some inde-
pendents, were given over sixty percent of the vote at the May 24, 1998
Legislative Council elections.5 5 Despite this resounding victory, demo-
crats were able to secure only one-third (twenty) of the sixty seats in the
Legislative Council. 56 Given that the ten Selection Committee seats
were a virtual give-away to the pro-China camp, and that ten functional
seats were awarded uncontested (nine to pro-business candidates and
one to a democrat), one might conclude that conservative and pro-China
politicians were practically given, through this conservative electoral
model, as many seats as democrats won through their landslide vic-
tory.57 After their victory, the democrats' attempt to secure passage of a
Legislative Council motion for a quicker pace of democratization was
predictably scuttled by split voting and other Basic law requirements.
58
All of this offers little optimism for democratization efforts. The
democrats are effectively left with only the moral force of their argu-
ment directed at highly resistant national and local governments, the
latter of which faces consequent legitimacy problems. Some have urged
that in the context of this legitimacy gap, and China's resistance to lib-
eralizing the formula for its so-called executive led local HKSAR gov-
ernment, it is wise to institute a ministerial system, thereby engaging
elected legislators in the government. 59 Given the moderate nature of
the democratic camp in Hong Kong this might work, though it is doubt-
ful that democrats will accept it as a substitute for democratization. In
the face of very moderate and responsible democrats the current con-
frontational approach by the government seems unwarranted. 60 One
55. Record Turnout Poised to Give Democrats Sweeping Victory, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, May 25, 1998, at 1.
56. Lessons of the Poll, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 26, 1998, at 18.
57. Jimmy Cheung & Joice Pang, Ten Take Office in Polls Walkover, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Apr. 25, 1998, at 1.
58. Chris Yeung, Democracy Debate Scuttled by Sparring, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
July 16, 1998, at 4. It is noteworthy that one leading democrat has even proposed that the
Chief Executive call a constitutional convention to address the demand for an increased
pace of democracy, a demand that seems unlikely to gain an affirmative response. No
Kwai-Yan, Call for Forum on Pace of Democracy, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 10, 1998,
at 6.
59. C.K. Lau, A Search for Harmony, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 25, 1998, at 19;
Siu-kai Lau, Ministers in the Making, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 3, 1998, at 25. The
current system employs various high-ranking civil servants to run government depart-
ments and an Executive Council, made up of private sector appointees that advises the
Chief Executive. Such a ministerial system might become a kind of bandage to lend le-
gitimacy to the government in the absence of substantial democratization.
60. The moderate quality of the democratic camp is evident even in their willingness
to participate in this biased electoral system. Beyond that, their moderateness was dem-
onstrated after their election when they joined hands with conservative forces to form a
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can only hope that when political difficulties arise the wall of resistance
to democracy does not result in increased political conflict.
B. The Human Rights Structure
Considering human rights on a constitutional level, the rights
chapter in the Basic Law, on its face, appears adequate because it in-
cludes various rights specified in the Joint Declaration, and specifies
that any restrictions on rights are subject to the requirements of the in-
ternational human rights covenants. 61 This chapter, along with provi-
sions respecting interpretation and review, was finalized in the Febru-
ary 1989 draft of the Basic Law, and was thus not a product of the
Tiananmen effect. It was the product of substantial debate and revision
of earlier, less satisfactory drafts. Where rights took a hit in the Basic
Law were in provisions beyond the rights chapter allowing for applica-
tion of national law in cases of emergency or where the central govern-
ment determines there is "turmoil" in the region and in provisions
which require the enactment of local laws against "sedition" and "sub-
version."62 These provisions had the imprint of Tiananmen. With an
adequate rights chapter and such ambiguous terms in other sections,
rights protection will ultimately depend on interpretation in the proc-
esses of enacting and enforcing laws, especially in the exercise of review
power.
63
Looking beyond the Basic Law, when considering the current
evolving human rights regime in Hong Kong, one discovers a surprising
vitality, though a plethora of threats.6 4 The vitality is a product of rich
public discourse and is evident in both cases and in the legislative proc-
united position on a six-point proposal to address the effects of the Asian economic crisis
in Hong Kong. Chris Yeung & Jimmy Cheung, Coalition, Donald Tsang Set for Show-
down, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 6, 1998, at 6.
61. Basic Law, supra note 2, at arts. 24-42.
62. Id. at arts 18, 23.
63. Any mainland role in delineating the boundaries of Hong Kong's rights protec-
tions is of concern. The mainland Chinese rights regime, is ideologically opposed to the
liberal one promised Hong Kong. It is said to have the following characteristics: 1) rights
are juxtaposed with duties; 2) rights are not considered inherent in humanhood but are
treated as the creation of the state; 3) welfare rights are emphasized over political rights;
and 4) instead of rights being a limit on the state, the state's interest are a limit on rights.
See generally R. RANDLE EDWARDS ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA
(1986). (stating that the contradiction in the respective systems is the basis for the "one
country, two systems" model for Hong Kong).
64. Under the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance enacted in 1991, the level of hu-
man rights litigation has been substantial. Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, No. 59
(June 8, 1991) reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1310 (1991). See generally Johannes Chan, The
Hong Kong bill of Rights 1991-1995: A Statistical Overview in HONG KONG'S BILL OF
RIGHTS: TWO YEARS BEFORE 1997 (George Edwards & Johannes Chan, eds.
1995)(discussing various aspects of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights and the Basic Law).
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ess.65 In many respects, the 1984 Joint Declaration, and later, the
tragic events at Tiananmen, stimulated a great deal of self-reflection
about human rights in Hong Kong's political culture. 66 With the han-
dover on the horizon, there was a degree of urgency, and Hong Kong's
people rose to the occasion. Though there were many menacing actions
by Chinese officials before the handover, and recent retrograde steps by
appointed Hong Kong officials, Hong Kong's evolving rights tradition
may survive such pressures. Certainly if vitality is a measure of the
survivability of this rights tradition, there is room for hope.
The international character of the emerging rights regime is its'
most striking quality.67 Hong Kong is at a veritable crossroads of inter-
national human rights forces. China stimulated much of this energy by
including substantial human rights guarantees, the international hu-
man rights covenants, and maintenance of the common law in the Joint
Declaration. 68 Because of this, the 1991 Bill of Rights Ordinance (which
remains in force after the handover, minus certain key provisions) cop-
ies almost verbatim the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR).69 When the Bill of Rights Ordinance was enacted, the
colonial constitution, the Letters Patent, was amended to include the
ICCPR.70 Under this rights regime the courts were called upon in the
last five years of colonial rule to exercise substantial constitutional ju-
dicial review power.7 1 Here again, the international character of the
rights regime was enhanced by frequent judicial reference to overseas
common law and European Union precedent. 72 After the enactment of
the Bill of Rights Ordinance the government, and the increasingly
democratic Legislative Council, in the last years of colonial rule, re-
formed many non-conforming colonial laws to better protect human
rights.7 3 Many of these reforms were especially important to secure
65. See id.
66. Id. See also HUMAN RIGHTS IN HONG KONG 1-2 (Raymond Wacks, ed., 1992).
67. See generally Michael C. Davis, Adopting International Standards of Human
Rights in Hong Kong, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINESE VALUES: LEGAL, PHILOSOPHICAL,
AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES 168 (Michael C. Davis, ed., 1995) (discussing the impact of
international standards, practices and values on human rights legislation).
68. Joint Declaration, supra note 1, art. 3(5) and Annex I, art. XIII.
69. Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, No. 59 (1991) reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1310
(1991); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967).
70. Hong Kong Letters Patent, No. 2 1991, reprinted in PUBLIC LAW AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: A HONG KONG SOURCEBOOK 19 (Andrew Byrnes and Johannes Chan eds., 1993).
71. See Chan, supra note 64.
72. See R v. Sin Yau Ming [1992] 1 H.K.C.L.R. 127, at 141-42 (CA) (specifying at
length the various foreign sources to be considered, including other common law jurisdic-
tions and the European Union cases under the European Convention on Human Rights).
73. The amended laws included the: 1) Societies Ordinance (1992); 2) Television Or-
dinance (1993); 3) Broadcast Ordinance (1993); 4) Public Order Ordinance (1995); and 5)
Emergency Regulations Ordinance (1995). See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights,
1995 Critique, 235-36 (1996).
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equal protection and freedom of speech.7 4
This reform process engendered a rather positive political environ-
ment for human rights protection, with substantial media coverage and
legislative consultation over proposed bills. During the last years of
colonial rule the largest local threat to rights development was the
rather conservative character of the evolving human rights jurispru-
dence and the ominous open hostility of several members of the then
highest local court, the Court of Appeals, to the Bill of Rights Ordi-
nance. 75 In spite of this, there was a surprising vitality both in political
discussion and in the courts.76 In some respects, the court's conservative
character may have served to reduce Chinese official hostility to the
rights regime. Subsequent to the handover, the Chinese government
announced it would continue to file reports on behalf of Hong Kong un-
der the international human rights covenants. Though it appears that
the local producers of these reports will follow a policy of keeping them
secret and not consulting with the Hong Kong public until after they
have been reviewed by officials in Beijing. 77
There is, however, considerable cause for pessimism about human
rights, evident in developments following the final handover process.
The initial flurry of activity relating to interpretation and implementa-
tion of human rights under the HKSAR regime has been disheartening.
The initial actions arose out of the Basic Law stipulation in Article 160
74. Several laws were passed or amended in this period to address the issue of dis-
crimination against women, including a 1994 ordinance allowing the inheritance of land
by women in the new territories, the 1995 sex discrimination ordinance, the 1995 equal
opportunities ordinance, and extension of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) to Hong Kong. Lawyers Committee for Hu-
man Rights, 1996 Critique, at 260-61. Despite these steps forward, more comprehensive
equal opportunity law proposals suggested by then legislator Anna Wu, were rejected by
the government. See Anna Wu, Why Hong Kong Should Have Equal Opportunities Legis-
lation and a Human Rights Commission, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINESE VALUES 185-
202 (Michael C. Davis, ed., 1995).
75. In a 1995 survey of Hong Kong court cases that raise the Bill of Rights issue, well
under one-third of the challenges were successful. See Chan, supra note 64, at 7. In the
last years of colonial rule, several members of the highest local court, the Court of Appeal,
expressed reservations about the Bill of Rights Ordinance, one even going so far, as the
Chair of the Local Judges Association, to file a critical report. Connie Law, Top Judge
Condemns Rights Bill, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 14, 1995, at 2; Benjamin Liu, The
Past, the Present, and the Future of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, reprinted in
CHAN, supra note 64, at 183; Margaret Ng, These Men Must Guard Our Liberty, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, May 31, 1996, at 21.
76. On the popular front, tens of thousands of Hong Kong people continued after the
handover to attend the June 4th Tiananmen memorial demonstrations in a public park.
Linda Choy & No Kwai-Yan, Tiananmen Sorrow Undimmed, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
June 5, 1998, at 1.
77. Jane Moir, Secrecy Over Rights Report Condemned, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Apr. 19, 1998, at 2. China has signed both of the two leading international human rights
covenants, though neither has been ratified. Beijing to Sign UN Rights Pact in Autumn,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 22, 1998, at 1.
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that the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC)
could determine existing laws to be in contravention of the Basic Law,
and therefore invalid. Assisted by its transition Preliminary Working
Committee, and later the Preparatory Committee, China proceeded to
review all of Hong Kong's laws under this provision.78 This became a
vehicle to reverse the most important parts of the above noted law re-
forms, especially respecting reform legislation which Chinese officials
had earlier opposed.7 9 The use of Article 160 review to take away
rights, rather than protect them, became a source of Hong Kong anxiety
about future rights security.
Several of the Beijing handover reversals had serious implications
for Hong Kong. The most serious reversal related to the 1992 electoral
proposal discussed above. At the handover, Beijing set aside the mod-
erately democratic electoral law for the 1995 election and established
an appointed provisional legislature.8 0 The Beijing appointed Prepara-
tory Committee also recommended deleting several implementing pro-
visions of the Bill of Rights Ordinance and setting aside the reforms in
the public order and societies ordinances; this recommendation was
formally carried out by the Standing Committee of China's NPC.81
The actions of the local government and the Provisional Legislature
immediately after the handover further heightened concern among
rights advocates.8 2 Laws were pushed through by this appointed provi-
sional body with little regard for the deprivation of the rights presuma-
78. See Connie Law & Chris Yeung, PWC Asks China to Bury Bill of Rights, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Oct. 18, 1995, at 1. Ultimately approximately twenty-five laws, including
the electoral laws and key rights guarantees, were recommended for abolition or revision.
Linda Choy & No Kwai-Yan, Tung In Talks Pledge as Laws Voted Down, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Feb. 2, 1997, at 1; Chris Yeung, China Ignores UK to Change Laws, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 24, 1997, at 1.
79. See Michael Davis, et al., Human Rights in Hong Kong: The Year of Transition, in
CHINA AND HONG KONG IN TRANSITION CH. 12 (Joseph W. Dellapena, ed., forthcoming
1999).
80. Legis. Council Ordinance CAP 542 (Sept. 28, 1997). See Davis, et al., supra note
79.
81. Yeung, supra note 78, at 1.
82. On July 1, the provisional legislature passed the reunification bill, which gave le-
gal effect to 13 bills that had been drafted by the appointed provisional legislature over
the border in Shenzhen in the months prior to the handover. These bills included
amendments to the 1992 Societies Ordinance and the 1995 Public Order Ordinance, re-
ducing protection of the freedom to assemble and to protest. The reunification bill was
followed by the legislative provisions (suspension of operations) bill, which froze and even-
tually scrapped pre-handover labor laws, including a bill protecting the right to collective
bargaining as stipulated in International Labor Organization Conventions 87 and 88.
Furthermore, the bill removed key elements of the 1991 Bill of Rights Ordinance, claim-
ing that it violated the Basic Law. This alleged violation was never explained. The Bill of
Rights Ordinance is a nearly verbatim adoption of the International Convention on Civil
and Political Rights, which is guaranteed in the Basic Law. See Davis, et al., supra note
79.
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bly secured under the Basic Law. While most rights and freedom of
speech are still protected in Hong Kong, there is cause for concern about
the roll-back of reform.83 As noted above, this Beijing appointed Provi-
sional Legislature also passed a very conservative electoral law that
guaranteed to reduce the democratic camp to a minority position. Be-
cause such electoral law deprives Hong Kong residents of substantial
democratic rights, the isolating of the democratic camp throughout the
transition is especially troubling .84
The post-handover period saw a whole list of other retrograde leg-
islative steps. The Provisional Legislature enacted new laws regarding
public order and societies. These laws contain ominous provisions with
respect to "national security".85 The provisional Legislature also en-
83. While free speech rights are generally protected in Hong Kong, areas of emerging
concern still arise. For example, empowering police to protect "national security" has
given rise to some ambiguous areas under vague guidelines. Sharon Cheung & Angela Li,
Ousted Legislators Express Concern at Protest Rules, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 19,
1997, at 6; Stella Lee & Angela Li, Security Ban on Freedom Rallies, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, July 19, 1997, at 1. There has been a noticeable increased aggressiveness of the
police as they enforce public order during demonstrations. Yulanda Chung & Clifford Lo,
Qiao Protestors Try to Storm Barricades, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 12, 1998, at 8;
Stella Lee, Democrat Criticises 'Hard-line' Policing, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 26,
1998, at 4. A primary concern for the police is to protect mainland officials from protests.
An example of one method occurred when the police played loud music to drown out pro-
test noise. Stella Lee, 'No Penalty' for Beethoven Protest Officer; Complaint Initially
Backed but Council Recommends Against Punishment Say Sources, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, May 6, 1998, at 2; Stella Lee & No Kwai-Yan, Police Clash with Anti-Jiang Demon-
strators, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 2, 1998, at 2. Pro-Beijing political figures have
also occasionally raised cause for concern. The recent situation where leading pro-Beijing
politician Xu Simin verbally attacked the local public broadcaster, RTHK, is a case in
point. Specifically, in March, 1998, Mr. Xu used the occasion of the meeting of the Chi-
nese People's Political Consultative Committee in Beijing to express concern that RTHK
was too critical of the government. Chiefs 'Failed' RTHK in Free Speech Debate, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Mar. 6, 1998, at 6; Linda Choy & Chris Yeung, Tung Sparks RTHK
Autonomy Fears; Government Policies Used to be Positively Presented Says Chief, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 5, 1998, at 1. It is noteworthy that officials in Beijing indi-
cated that this is a matter for Hong Kong and encouraged Hong Kong NPC and CPPCC
deputies not to meddle in Hong Kong's local affairs. Linda Choy, Xu's Attack on RTHK
Dismissed, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 8, 1998, at 4; Linda Choy, HKDeputies Warned
Not to Meddle; Jiang Tells NPC Delegation They Must Stay Out of SAR Government Af-
fairs, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 10, 1998, at 1. A similar criticism was leveled by
Beijing at local NPC delegates when they criticized a court decision in 1999. Kwai-Yan
No, 'Keep Quiet'Call to Local NPC Deputies, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 11, 1999, at 4.
84. Leading democrats continue to be refused the right to enter the mainland that is
accorded all other Hong Kong Chinese. Angela Li & Genevieve Ku, Twelve Still Face
Travel Ban on Mainland, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 6, 1998, at 9.
85. Margaret Ng, Threat to Our Civil Rights, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 11, 1997,
at 23; Joice Pang, National Security 'Knife Hanging Over Us, Activists Tell of Fears SAR
Government Could Use Changes In Laws As Pretext to Bar Those It Dislikes, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, May 16, 1997, at 3; Chris Yeung, Restraints on Protests and Political
Finding Relaxed; 11 Changes But Future Government Stands Firm on National Security,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 16, 1997, at 1. The only positive event relating to national
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acted a law that deprives mainland children of local Hong Kong perma-
nent residents of their immediate right of entry into Hong Kong, that
guaranteed reducing the Basic Law right of residence; this law applied
retroactively.8 6 In addition, the Provisional Legislature voted to sus-
pend (for further study) labor rights ordinances and provisions extend-
ing the Bill of Rights Ordinance to include private violations. 87 These
laws were enacted by the previous elected Legislative Council in its fi-
nal days.88 The "study" ultimately resulted in the full suspension of
nearly all of the labor rights protections and the right for private ac-
tions under the Bill of Rights provided by pre-handover legislation. 89 All
of this adds up to a rather crass disregard of rights protection and por-
tends a rather ominous future.
C. Rule of Law
Whether the Basic Law falls short of the Joint Declaration's re-
quirements regarding human rights depends a great deal on interpreta-
tion and the institution of constitutional judicial review. On their face
the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law implicitly require the exercise
of constitutional judicial review under the Basic Law. 9o Both docu-
ments require supremacy of the Basic Law, maintenance of the common
law system, and independence and finality in the local courts. 91 These
general requirements, now fully embodied in the Basic Law, would not
security is that the government has not yet carried out the Basic Law Article 23 require-
ment to enact a subversion law. May Sin-Mi Hon, Subversion Law Will Not Be Rushed, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, June 30, 1998, at 1.
86. Sin-Mi Hon, supra note 85, at 1; May Sin-Mi Hon & Angela Li, Abode Status Bill
Gets Vote of Approval; Legislators Ignore Growing Fears of Court Challenge to Endorse
Government Move, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 10, 1997, at 1.
87. The elected Legislative Council enacted several laws in the final hours of the pre-
July 1, 1997, session, but the provisional legislature suspended them for further study
until October 31, 1997. The suspended laws included labor laws that protect workers
rights to collective bargaining-, forbid discrimination against workers for union activities;
and a general law that extends the Bill of Rights to include private actions. Genevieve
Chan, Activists in Last-ditch Bid to Save Labour Laws, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 15,
1997, at 6; Angela Li, et al., Protestors Invade Gallery But Fail to Thwart Snub to Dis-
banded Legco; Pre-July I Laws Frozen, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 17, 1997, at 1.
88. See Davis, et al., supra note 79.
89. Jimmy Cheung, Vote Overturns Amendments to Bill of Rights, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Feb. 26, 1998, at 6. See also Margaret Ng, Wrong Way on Rights, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Jan. 23, 1998, at 21.
90. The Joint Declaration guarantees the maintenance of the common law system,
the independence and finality of the local courts and the right to challenge the executive
in the courts. Joint Declaration, supra note 1, at Annex I, arts. 2, 3 and 13. The Basic
Law includes the same requirements in addition to various detailed requirements com-
mon to common law systems respecting the judiciary. Basic Law, supra note 2, at arts. 2,
8, 17, 80-96 and 158.
91. Id. See also id. at art. 11.
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allow less.92 Article 158 of the Basic Law specifically vests the power of
interpretation of the Basic Law in the Standing Committee of the NPC.
However, the Article further specifies that the Standing Committee
shall authorize local courts, when adjudicating cases, to interpret those
provisions which are "within the limits of the autonomy of the Region"
and "other provisions."93  Under further provisions in Article 158, if
courts are confronted with the interpretation of provisions, which are
the responsibility of the Central People's Government or concern lo-
cal/central relations, then they must refer the matter to the Standing
Committee of the NPC.94 The Standing Committee, upon such referral,
then decides the matter with the advice of the Committee for the Basic
Law.
95
Basic Law Article 17 further specifies that the Standing Committee
can review newly enacted local legislation for conformity to the Basic
Law, again within the scope of central authority or local/central rela-
tions, and with the advice of the Committee for the Basic Law.
96 Sym-
metry and common law practice suggest that courts have such review
power within the scope of autonomy, or in any other case where the
court determines that such referral is not required.97 As a further limi-
tation, under Article 19 courts have no jurisdiction over "acts of state
such as defense and foreign affairs."98 These are the two areas where
China retains power over the HKSAR. 99 The breadth of the HKSAR act
of state doctrine is yet to be determined. 10 0 Other than the Basic Law,
92. Id. at arts. 2, 8, 11.
93. Id. at art. 158. The reference to "other provisions" in the third paragraph of Arti-
cle 158 is not limited by the scope of autonomy.
94. Id.
95. The Committee for the Basic Law is provided for in NPC legislation enacted along
with the Basic Law. It is made up of six local and six mainland members. Decision of the
National People's Congress to Approve the Proposal by the Drafting Committee for the
Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region on the Establishment of the
Committee for the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Under the
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, Adopted at the Third Session of
the Seventh National People's Congress on 4 April 1990 (published with the Basic Law).
The Basic Law Committee was already appointed and in place upon the handover. Linda
Choy & May Sin-Mi Hon, Airport Boss Gets Senior Basic Law Job, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, June 28, 1997, at 6.
96. Basic Law, supra note 2, at art. 17.
97. In that the Joint Declaration requires independence and finality in the local
courts and the Basic Law assigns some review power, especially concerning matters of
central authority or local/central relations to the NPC Standing Committee, the Basic
Law appears to fall somewhat short of the Joint Declaration's requirements in this area.
98. Basic Law, supra note 2, at art. 19.
99. Id. at arts. 13 and 14.
100. One would hope that this exclusion of court jurisdiction will be rather narrowly
defined, perhaps with a scope roughly equivalent to the United States act of state or po-
litical question doctrines. However, this hope might be misplaced in light of a Sino-
British deal on the Court of Final Appeal which added the word "etc." to the phrase "de-
fense and foreign affairs."
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the only mainland laws that ordinarily apply, through local enactment,
in the HKSAR are those specifically listed in Annex III to the Basic
Law. 0 1
In the 1998 landmark judgment in the Ng Ka Ling case, the Hong
Kong Court of Final Appeal (CFA) declared quite clearly that it has the
power of constitutional judicial review over local Hong Kong legislation
and that it has the right to examine acts of the mainland's NPC for con-
formity to the Basic Law. 10 2 The Ng Ka Ling judgment arose out of a
challenge to a local Hong Kong immigration statute which severely in-
hibited the Basic Law guaranteed right of abode in Hong Kong for chil-
dren born to Hong Kong resident parents. 0 3 In exercising the power of
constitutional judicial review to overturn several provisions which
heavily burdened that right, the Court declared it would take a pur-
poseful and generous approach to interpreting constitutional rights
guaranteed in the Basic Law. 10 4 In the judgment, the Court also ex-
plicitly declared that the CFA would have to determine when, in decid-
ing disputed cases, to refer provisions respecting local-central relations
or matters of central authority to the Standing Committee of the
NPC.105 The court took a narrow view of when such referral was re-
quired and concluded it was not required in this case.
While this decision was widely applauded in Hong Kong for its firm
and unambiguous defense of human rights and the rule of law, there
was a very severe response on two occasions. Immediately after the
judgment was issued, leading mainland officials and "legal scholars", as
well as their local pro-China supporters attacked the part of the judg-
ment where the court articulated its right to "examine" acts of the NPC,
claiming the Court was putting itself above the NPC.106 They claimed
101. Basic Law, supra note 2, at art. 18.
102. Ng Ka Ling v. Director of Immigration, Court of Final Appeal, Final Appeal 14 of
1998 (January 29, 1999) [hereinafter Ng Ka Ling 1].
103. Article 24 of the Basic Law (the first Article in the chapter entitled "Chapter III:
Fundamental Rights and Duties of the Residents) provides that Hong Kong residents in-
clude "persons of Chinese nationality born outside of Hong Kong" of Hong Kong residents.
Under the Article, such residents are entitled, as are other Hong Kong residents, to the
right of abode and a permanent identity card. The suit was brought by several such chil-
dren claiming a denial of their basic right of residence under a newly enacted immigration
ordinance which required them to apply on the mainland for an exit permit. The practical
effect of such application process was likely to cause a lengthy delay, even years, of their
entry into Hong Kong. See Basic Law, supra note 2, at art. 24.
104. While the courts assertive approach to protect the rule of law was widely ap-
plauded in Hong Kong, there was considerable public concern over the dangers of a flood
of mainland born people with this right which would result from the decision. Lau Siu-
Kai, Verdict Tips the Political Balance, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 2, 1999, at 17.
105. The standing committee would then be advised by the Basic Law committee
when rendering such interpretation. Basic Law, supra note 2, at art. 158.
106. Mark O'Neill, Beijing Says Abode Ruling was Wrong and Should be Changed, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 9, 1999, at 1.
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the judgment had to be "rectified". 0 7 The HKSAR government filed an
unprecedented motion for the CFA to "clarify" the orbiter dicta in its
judgment declaring its power to examine acts of the NPC.108 This clari-
fication was granted in a second brief judgment in which the Court ex-
plicitly stated that it did not hold itself above the NPC, a judgment in
which the Court essentially restated its original position. 109 A second,
more serious attack on the Judgment and the Rule of Law occurred in
May 1999 when the government, after issuing a Report claiming the
Judgment would produce a flood of 1.67 million migrants into Hong
Kong, made a request to the Standing Committee of the NPC to inter-
pret the relevant provisions of the Basic Law, effectively overturning
the CFA Judgment. 11 As a result of the latter action, the finality of
judgments of the CFA in Hong Kong has clearly been called into ques-
tion and the Rule of Law has been seriously undermined.
107. See Margaret Ng, The Legal Perils of 'Rectification"', S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Feb. 26, 1999, at 19.
108. Cliff Buddle, et al., Judges Asked to Clarify Right of Abode Decision, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Feb. 25, 1999, at 1.
109. Ng Ka Ling v. Director of Immigration, Court of Final Appeal, Final Appeal No.
14 of 1998 (Feb. 26, 1999) [hereinafter Ng Ka Ling I]. In the original judgment the Court
had really not held itself above the NPC, but had merely indicated that it would imple-
ment the Basic Law as required by the NPC; it had not denigrated the NPC Standing
Committee's power to interpret the Basic Law. In the second clarifying judgment, the
CFA simply made this more explicit while continuing to uphold the pre-eminence of the
Basic Law. The Court concluded, "nor did the court's judgment question, and the Court
accepts that it cannot question, the authority of the National People's Congress or the
Standing Committee to do any act which is in accordance with the provisions of the Basic
Law and the procedure therein." Id. It appears that a Court created under the Basic Law
was merely upholding the priority of the Basic Law as required on its face. The over-
turning of local legislation implicates the standard separation of powers concerns of con-
stitutional judicial review. In addressing its relationship to the NPC, the Court appeared
to be merely giving priority, as a source of law, to the sovereign instructions of the NPC
reflected in the Basic Law. In the Second clarifying judgment, the Court explicitly sought
only to respond to confusion over "interpretations (which) have been put on part of the
court's judgment", and not to amend the judgment.
110. In late April the government eventually estimated the likely migration figure to
be 1.67 million. Chris Yeung, Court Gives 1.67 m Right of Abode, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Apr. 29, 1999, at 1. The government asked the Standing Committee to re-interpret
Articles 22 (which relates to Mainland control of people from other parts of China) and
24(3) (which specifies the residence rights of children born to Hong Kong residents) to ef-
fectively overturn the CFA Final Judgment. Chris Yeung, NPC Will be Asked to Revoke
Abode Rights for 1.5m Migrants, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 19, 1999, at 1. In doing
this, the government targeted for exclusion the children of Hong Kong residents who were
born before their parents became residents. The CFA previously upheld the right of such
children under Article 24. The government explicitly rejected the more legally acceptable
alternative of amending the Basic Law. The government's decision to undermine a Final
Court Judgment has produced strong condemnation from the Democratic camp, the Bar
and leading constitutional scholars. Michael C. Davis, Home to Roost, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, May 16, 1999, at 10; Angela Li, Uproar Sweeps Democracy Camp, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, May 19, 1999, at 3.
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When it comes to the rule of law in Hong Kong, there are several
troubling aspects of the circumstances surrounding this case. The most
blatent damage is reflected in the simple reality that final judgments in
Hong Kong, at least where constitutional rights are concerned, are sim-
ply not final. They are subject to being overturned by a combination of
local government and Mainland interference. This will certainly have a
chilling effect on courts."'i There is reason for real concern that the
Hong Kong courts will be faced with further political attacks by main-
land and pro-China forces in the future. This may lead to intimidation
and timidity in the Courts. There is specific concern that several of the
political attacks on the court's judgment were articulated by members
of the Basic Law Committee, the very committee which would be called
upon to advise the Standing Committee of the NPC when issues of Ba-
sic Law interpretation are referred.11 2 The members of this committee
showed little concern to maintain a judicial demeanor, leading to suspi-
cion that any future advice forthcoming from this committee will be of a
political, rather than legal, nature. The government's motion for clarifi-
cation raises further concern about the court's independence and final-
ity. The only positive aspect of this procedure and the resultant ex-
traordinary judgment is that the Court appeared to stick to its
substantive position in articulating its clarification.
111. Article 158 of the Basic Law designates the Hong Kong CFA to determine when
a matter must be referred to the Standing Committee. For the Standing Committee to be
asked by the government to offer an alternative interpretation in reaction to a final judi-
cial decision violated the guaranteed independence and finality of the local courts and the
procedures outlined in Article 158. Basic Law, supra note 2, at arts. 19 and 158. The
governments sidestepped the problem of a lack of specified power in the government to
make such referral by seeking an endorsement from the Legislative Council (which was
assured, given the process by which the majority of the Legislators were selected) and
asking the State Council to make the referral on its behalf. In referring the right of abode
case to the Standing Committee, the government took the position that the right of the
Standing Committee to interpret the Basic Law has no limits. The government's submis-
sion emphasized that the Standing Committee has the best grasp of the true legislative
intent. This emphasis on the privileged knowledge of the drafters appears to empower
Mainland leaders and their local Hong Kong supporters in a perverse use of a rather
questionable original intent doctrine. Under this view, neither independence and finality
in the courts, the provisions in Article 159 respecting Basic Law amendment, nor Hong
Kong's autonomy appear to constrain NPC Standing Committee action. Mainland leaders
and their appointed Hong Kong supporters, among local NPC delegates and the Basic
Law Committee, will take up the central role of giving meaning to the Basic Law. Such
interpretation of the Mainland NPC Standing Committee's power would seemingly, in the
face of local or Mainland government dissatisfaction, render the Basic Law a nullity, and
cannot be right.
112. Basic Law, supra note 2, at art. 158; Decision of the National People's Congress
to Approve the Proposal by the Drafting Committee for the Basic Law of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region on the Establishment of the Committee for the Basic Law
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region under the Standing Committee of the
National People's Congress, adopted at the Third Session of the Seventh National People's
Congress on 4 April 1990 (Apr. 4, 1990) [hereinafter Basic Law Committee Decision].
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Though the Court of Final Appeals has seemingly taken a firm
stand on constitutional judicial review there is plenty of room for timid
judges to shirk this responsibility and for the government to continue to
threaten the judicial bedrock of Hong Kong's stability. In addition to a
generally conservative human rights posture, judges may avoid their
responsibility through several routes. by: 1) claiming to avoid sensitive
political issues;113 2) too readily referring matters to the Standing
Committee under the above noted articles; 1 4 or 3) simply giving in to
official political pressure or intimidation. 115 The President of the Legis-
lative Council (and the then Beijing appointed Provisional Legislature),
Rita Fan Hsu Lai-tai, soon after the handover, had even argued that
legislation that has not been overturned by the Standing Committee of
the NPC under Article 17 of the Basic Law was presumptively constitu-
tional. 1 6 The concern with this negative presumption theory is that it
would undermine the entire system of common law review and repre-
sents a serious hazard to the rule of law in Hong Kong. Another hazard
would be for the Standing Committee to all too frequently interfere by
reviewing laws or overriding final judicial judgments, as has been re-
quested in the Ng Ka Ling Case.
Finally, the Rule of Law in Hong Kong has been continuously
threatened by the rather passive approach of the Hong Kong Secretary
for Justice, the government official charged with upholding the Rule of
Law and prosecutorial functions. The government has been rocked by a
series of criticisms concerning its commitment to the Rule of Law. 1 7
113. When a member of the Democratic Party was denied leave for judicial review to
challenge the legality of certain actions of the Provisional Legislature prior to the hando-
ver, the judge is reported to have described him as a pawn of the Democratic Party and to
have indicated that the court would not get involved in a political wrangle between the
Chinese and British governments. See Audrey Eu, Keep Politics Out of the Law, FAR E.
ECON. REV., July 10, 1997, at 34.
114. Michael C. Davis, Threat to Integrity, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 20, 1997, at
10.
115. In this regard it is ominous that the mainland Public Security Bureau already
got into the debate on the law respecting the residence rights of mainland children of
Hong Kong residents by indicating its view that the law did not violate the Basic Law.
Chris Yeung & Linda Choy, Beijing Backs Bill Deporting Thousands of 'II Children, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, July 15, 1997, at 1.
116. Specifically she noted the legislative obligation under Article 17 to report all
new ordinances to the Standing Committee; if the Standing Committee did not object to
the ordinance, (in that case the ordinance restricting the residence rights of Mainland
children of Hong Kong permanent residents) then she argued it was presumptively consti-
tutional. May Sin-Mi Hon, Public 'Can Judge Attempts for Help,' S. CHINA MORNING
POST, July 14, 1997, at 6.
117. These included the failure to prosecute Xinhua for allegedly violating the privacy
act; the failure to prosecute Sally Aw, a prominent business executive and CCPCC mem-
ber, after she was implicated as a co-conspirator in the Hong Kong Standard corruption
scandal in which several others were convicted (the Secretary of Justice argued in part
that "the public interest" demanded that Ms. Aw not be prosecuted because she was the
head of a large corporation in financial trouble); the big spender case, in which the gov-
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The government appears to continually take a passive approach to de-
fending the Rule of Law and seems determined to shy away from any
challenges to central authorities.1 18 The risk of further hazards await
additional post-handover experience. To the government's credit, it has
put in place a highly respected Chief Justice and the Court of Final Ap-
peal that provided the excellent judgment in the right of abode case dis-
cussed above. 119 But even good judges, in a politically unsupportive en-
vironment, may not save Hong Kong's human rights and rule of law
regime from the many potential hazards on the horizon. 120
ernment remained silent while a Hong Kong citizen was executed for crimes committed in
part within Hong Kong's local jurisdiction; the related case of the Telford Gardens mur-
der, where the government again remained quiet while a Mainland court tried and con-
victed a suspect for crimes committed entirely within Hong Kong's jurisdiction; and fi-
nally, with regard to the right of abode case, pushing for a clarification and the ultimate
overturning of the decision by the Court of Final Appeal, after speaking to leaders in Bei-
jing. The Secretary of Justice was reported to have actually discussed her plans to file the
clarification motion with the Chief Justice of the Court before the decision to seek clarifi-
cation was made public. As a result of the Sally Aw case and these various circum-
stances, the Legislative Council held a vote of no-confidence in the Secretary of Justice on
March 12, 1999, but the motion failed to pass after heavy government lobbying. Chris
Yeung, Doubts Planted Over Rule of Law, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 6, 1999, at 5;
Chris Yeung & Rhonda Lam Wan, Justice Secretary Survives Vote Despite Attacks on
Competence, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 12, 1999, at 1.
118. In one of the last ordinances proposed by the government for enactment by the
Provisional Legislature in April 1998 - the Adaptation of Laws Ordinance - the review of
certain acts of Mainland bodies was delivered a severe blow when certain Mainland or-
ganizations were exempted from the application of any laws that did not explicitly or by
necessary implication apply to them. This law exempts both mainland official bodies and
the local HKSAR government. The bill was widely criticized for exceeding the powers of
the Provisional Legislature, for violating Basic Law provisions specifying that Mainland
organs are subject to the HKSAR laws, and for essentially putting Mainland official bod-
ies above the law. The Mainland bodies to which this law applies seemingly include the
local branch of the New China News Agency (Xinhua), the Chinese Foreign Ministry, the
local PLA Garrison and the Chinese side of the Joint Liaison Group. Gren Manuel, Legal
Experts Fear Bill Will Make Mainland Organs Immune to at Least 14 Pieces of HK Legis-
lation: State Bodies 'Exempt for Laws', S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 29, 1998, at 1; Gren
Manuel & Felix Chan, Rights Monitor Fears 'Two Systems of Law,' Bar Lashes Out Over
Transfer of Privileges, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 7, 1998, at 1; Gren Manuel & Angela
Li, Courts Decide on Exempt State Bodies, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 8, 1998, at 6.
119. May Sin-Mi Hon & Patricia Young, Continuity in Choice of Top Appeal Judges,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 13, 1997, at 1; Chris Yeung, Andrew Li Named as Top
Judge, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 21, 1997, at 1. The Court of Appeal (under the
CFA) has also recently gained some credit by overturning local ordinances that prohibit
flag desecration. HKSAR v. Ng Kung-Siu, Court of Appeal, Magistry Appeal No. 563 of
1998, Mar. 23, 1999. This case is now on appeal to the CFA. With the recent intimidation
in the Ng Ka-Ling case there is cause for concern that the CFA may shy away from ruling
that flag desecration is protected as a matter of Freedom of Speech. Cliff Buddle, Defiling
Flags No Crime: Judges, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 24, 1999, at 1.
120. To the current court's credit, it has recently demonstrated a serious commitment
to open justice by adopting a report requiring a large number of civil proceedings, that
were previously held in chambers without public access, to be open to the public. Cliff
Buddle, Judges Unlock Doors of Closed Court Hearings, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 11,
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III. A COMPETING POLITICAL PARADIGM- THE SINGAPOREANIZATION OF
HONG KONG
To make constitutional sense out of the above policies and practices
it is important to consider the objectives that may underlie China's
plans for Hong Kong and to evaluate their internal consistency. This
section considers the political and economic ideas that shape China's
evolving Hong Kong human rights policies. The long-standing Chinese
official admonition that Hong Kong is to be an "economic," not a "politi-
cal" city, suggests the ideological source of Hong Kong's current human
rights tensions, and the political risks on the horizon.'21 There appears
to be a kind of Singaporean vision-authoritarianism plus liberal eco-
nomic policies and some commitment to the rule of law-evident in offi-
cial circles in China and the HKSAR.122 For the present analysis, I will
just briefly focus on some of the evidence of this vision and the difficul-
ties it offers for human rights purposes. 23 The general idea of this vi-
sion is that Hong Kong people should just concentrate on making
money and leave politics to China's chosen Hong Kong leaders. The
purveyors of this vision would have Hong Kong people avoid political
agitation and criticisms that might trouble the mainland regime and
concentrate on business and material wealth formation. That is, the
business of Hong Kong is business; politics should not distract people
from that. This view is consistent with the views of the local business
elite, who are being asked by mainland officials to run Hong Kong. Yet,
this view creates a considerable challenge to those who value democracy
and freedom.
The most striking evidence of the attempted Singaporeanization of
Hong Kong is purposeful concentration of political power in Hong Kong
in the hands of the business elite. Appointed Chief Executive Tung
Chee Hwa is one of the most successful businessmen in Hong Kong. He
has surrounded himself in the chief government deliberative body - the
Executive Council - with a predominance of conservative business and
pro-China people. 124 Similar appointees make up the local NPC delega-
tion and the Basic Law Committee that have seized center stage in the
1998, at 1; Cliff Buddle, Top Judges Back Changes in Full, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb.
25, 1998, at 1.
121. Warnings that Hong Kong not be turned into a political city were made by
China's then chief policy spokesman on Hong Kong, Mr. Lu Ping. Linda Choy, Lu Warns
Against Meddling, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 7, 1994, at 1.
122. See generally Beng-Huat Chua, Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Sin-
gapore (1995) (discussing Singapore's political development).
123. A more thorough analysis of this aspect of China's Hong Kong Policy is taken up
in my recent article. Michael C. Davis, Constitutionalism in Hong Kong: Politics Versus
Economics, 18 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 157 (1997).
124. Chris Yeung, Tung Reveals His Top Team, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 25,
1997, at 1.
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right of abode row. A similar concentration of political power was also
reflected in the defunct appointed Provisional Legislature. 125 This rule
by tycoon is the rather stunning product of political appointments by
Beijing's allegedly Marxist regime. In the transition, both the Chief
Executive and the Provisional Legislature were chosen by a 400 mem-
ber Selection Committee which was itself chosen by the business sector
dominated, and Beijing appointed, Preparatory Committee.
126
By insuring a predominance of business elite in the now defunct
Selection Committee and Preparatory Committee, China insured a like-
minded first HKSAR government. 127 Throughout the closing years of
colonial rule, Chinese officials worked energetically to exclude the more
grass roots oriented Democratic Party from its various appointed advi-
sory bodies, though it allowed another grass roots oriented pro-China
party to have a minor role.128 As noted above, China has been especially
concerned with ensuring that popular democracy does not take hold.
This was the basis for objecting to Chris Patten's democratization for-
mula. The continued concentration of power in the conservative busi-
ness elite seems assured under the above noted electoral model slated
for the coming years. A legislative majority agreeable to Beijing is es-
sentially assured through the combination of narrow business oriented
functional constituencies and proportional representation in direct geo-
graphical polls.
129
This Singaporeanization is more widely evident on the rhetorical
125. With a makeup of 33 of the then incumbent legislators mostly from conservative
functional constituencies and parties, minus the democrats, plus eleven mostly pro-China
losers of the 1995 elections, the Provisional Legislature reflected a sharp swing to the
right and the pro-China camp in comparison to the previous elected Legislative Council.
Incumbents and Legco Losers win Selection Fight; Qian's Pointer to Smooth Transition is
Martin Lee's 'Darkest Day' since '89, While Governor Sickened, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Dec. 22, 1996, at 1.
126. Linda Choy and Fung Wai-Kong, Four Lesser Known Candidates Declared After
Selection Body Finalized: Race for Chief Executive Down to Eight Runners, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Nov. 3, 1996, at 1.
127. In the 150-member appointed Preparatory Committee, only about 15 (many of
which are from the pro-China camp) would be considered grassroots representatives. The
Preparatory Committee - The List of Members, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 29, 1995, at
6; Fung Wai-Kong, Committee 'Full of China Puppets,' S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 14,
1996, at 7 (reporting a Legislative Council motion condemning this). The Selection Com-
mittee, which was selected by a vote of the Preparatory Committee, had 400 members, of
which 100 were listed as grassroots, with the balance being business and professional.
Full List of Winners in the Beijing Ballot, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 3, 1996, at 4.
128. The popular Democratic Party was completely excluded from appointment to the
Preparatory Committee, which served as the foundation for the subsequent chain of selec-
tion processes culminating in the formation of the HKSAR government. Connie Law &
Louis Won, Warning of Threat to Autonomy, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 29, 1995, at 5.
129. See Chris Yeung, Keeping a Tight Rein on Legco; 'It Will Be a More Fragmented
Body With No Single Political Party Able to Snap Up a Sizeable Majority of Seats, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, July 12, 1997, at 15.
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plane, in the rhetoric of mainland officials and their Hong Kong ap-
pointees. This rhetoric began to emerge in 1989 when mainland officials
began worrying about Hong Kong being a "base of subversion."'130 Many
of the above noted efforts to cut back on democracy, human rights and
the rule of law followed in the early 1990s. 131 But this rhetoric acquired
a more concrete "Asian values" and economic developmental message in
the late transition period. The notion of a politically inert and economi-
cally dynamic Hong Kong began to take shape in Chinese policy pro-
nouncements. A sampling of this rhetoric includes the following situa-
tions. In May 1994, China's then chief policy spokesman on Hong Kong,
Lu Ping, warned against attempts to turn Hong Kong into a "political
city;" China's Ninth Five-Year Plan in 1995 introduces an economic
partnership, while characterizing the political relationship as "between
a parent and a child."132  By 1996 Chinese officials were warning
against commemorative marches to remember June 4, 1989, personal
attacks on Chinese leaders, the spreading of rumors and lies, demon-
strations against the Chinese government or the advocacy of Taiwan
independence. 13 3 Although some of the latter warnings were later re-
tracted, the main emphases of these comments have persisted in the
post-colonial HKSAR government.
1 34
China's appointed HKSAR leaders, charged with passing laws on
public order, subversion and sedition, have shown an alarming ten-
dency to pick up on some of these politically charged themes to advance
"national security" and restrain hostile international forces.135 The
130. In July 1989 the new Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Jiang Zemin
warned that "the well water does not interfere with the river water" and the People's
Daily accused democrats Martin Lee and Szeto Wah of "subversive activities." See Chro-
nology, supra note 23, at 209 (providing a chronology of the history of Hong Kong).
131. See id. at 211-14.
132. See Willy Wo-lap Lam, Economy to Remain Separate After '97, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Sept. 8, 1995, at 1.
133. See Chris Yeung, Anti-Beijing Protests to Be Banned, Says Lu Ping, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, June 5, 1996, at 1; Chris Yeung, Britain to Take Action on Quian's June 4
Ban, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 18, 1996, at 1; Chris Yeung, Contradictions Cast a
Shadow; 'They (The Media) Can Put Forward Critic, But Not Rumors or Lies (or)... Per-
sonal Attacks on Chinese Leaders', S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 19, 1996, at 19; Chris
Yeung, Lu Clarifies Position on Press Freedom, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 6, 1996, at
1.
134. John Ridding, Tung Denies Plan for Crackdown on Dissent, FIN. TIMES, May 1,
1997, at 6. After the Handover, Mainland Foreign Ministry Officials said that the June 4,
1998 commemorative demonstrations posed no threat and would not affect Hong Kong-
Mainland relations. Linda Choy & No Kwai-Yan, Tiananmen Sorrow Undimmed, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, June 5, 1998, at 1.
135. The 1997 Public Order Ordinance allows police to object to demonstrations on
"national security" grounds, which is defined as "safeguarding the territorial integrity and
independence of the People's Republic of China." They are also allowed to take into con-
sideration whether Tibetan or Taiwanese independence was advocated. See Davis, et al.,
supra note 79. In August 1998, fears over "foreign speculators" were marshaled to sup-
port government intervention in the stock market and to give the Chief Executive greater
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above noted attack by local CPPCC delegate Xu Simin on the failure of
public broadcaster RTHK to support the government position is just a
more blunt recent local manifestation of this political line. The Chief
Executive has often emphasized alleged Chinese values to avoid con-
frontation, encouraging people to "talk more about our duties rather
than our rights."136 In early 1998, the Chief Executive reemphasized
that Hong Kong should not be an "anti-Beijing base."'137 The passage by
the Provisional Legislature of a law to set aside the protection of vari-
ous workers' rights in the first weeks of the HKSAR, further suggest
the intention of China's appointed Hong Kong leaders to impose a
strong business orientation on the new Hong Kong regime. 138 Likewise,
the elevation of expediency over the principles associated with the Rule
of Law in the right of abode row demostrates the ascendency of the Sin-
gaporean vision. This intention is also evident in the increased empha-
sis on the need to plan Hong Kong's economy. 139 This emphasis became
evident when the government established a new high-powered advisory
Commission on Strategic Development. 140 In the face of the East Asian
economic crisis, one would hope the movement would be away from the
East Asian developmental model. These various developmental argu-
ments have thus far been confronted by a well developed democratic
movement and a sophisticated free press.
The disturbing aspect of this ostensibly Singaporean orientation is
the lack of a coherent vision that may have animated some of the ear-
lier Asian developmental models, and the utter inapplicability of this
decision-making power. Tsang Plea for Global Purge of Speculators, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Sept. 9, 1998, at 1.
136. Fung Wai-Kong, et al., Tung Stresses Consensus, Not Confrontation, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Oct. 23, 1996, at 1; Chris Yeung, Tung Wants Focus on Daily Life, Not
Politics, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 28, 1996, at 4; Chris Yeung and Linda Choy, Tung
Manifesto Preaches Chinese Cultural Virtues, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 23, 1996, at
4. See also Hong Kong's Freedoms Imperiled, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1996, at 28.
137. Jimmy Cheung, Anti-Beijing Base Warning by Tung, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Mar. 9, 1998, at 4; Fung Wai-Kong et al., Tung Stresses Consensus, Not Confrontation, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 23, 1996, at 1.
138. The Provisional Legislature set aside several laws to protect workers rights and
rights under the Bill of Rights Ordinance enacted in the last week of the elected Legisla-
tive Council. See Angela Li et al., Pre-July 1 Laws Frozen, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July
17, 1997, at 1.
139. The influential Chair of the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce has em-
phasized that Hong Kong should move away from the colonial laissez faire economic pol-
icy toward more planned business-friendly anti-labor policies. James Tien Pei-chun,
Bright Prospects, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 8, 1997, at 10.
140. Tung Chee-Hua, Policy Address 97, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 9, 1997; Chris
Yeung, Public to Help Forge Long-term Strategy, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 17, 1998,
at 6. In addition to the Commission on Strategic Development, the Government also es-
tablished a Council of International Advisors, comprised of fourteen foreign business
leaders. Offering a New Perspective, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan 20, 1999; Win Friends
and Influence People, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 16, 1998.
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Singaporean model to Hong Kong. Asian developmental models seek to
capitalize on certain alleged Asian values 141 and a form of capitalist
planned economy.142 The more substantial micro-planning component
tends to target certain industries for external competition under an ex-
port-led growth paradigm. 43 This might be combined with certain
forms of social welfare, especially housing and health care, to afford the
regime legitimacy based on success relating to livelihood issues.
There are two apparent problems with this idea in the Hong Kong
context. First, Hong Kong, as distinguished from the other Asian
Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs), has not traditionally relied on
this micro-planning model to achieve its enormous economic success.
Second, even those Asian NICs that have relied on such a model have,
in recent years, recognized the need for political and economic reform to
allow greater openness and competition. This recognition has been es-
pecially encouraged by the current economic crisis. With regard to the
first issue, political economists have generally characterized the Hong
Kong model as embodying laissez faire competition and macro-
infrastructural support. 144 The laissez faire component has relied on
the rule of law and freedom to insure a level playing field; the infra-
structural support has included substantial housing and transportation
subsidy, as well as substantial public health care.
145
Regarding the second point, the other Asian rapid-developers have
141. Samuel Huntington argues that Confucian society advances the group over the
individual, authority over liberty, responsibility over rights, and values such as harmony,
cooperation, order, and respect for hierarchy. Samuel P. Huntington, Democracy's Third
Wave, in THE GLOBAL RESURGENCE OF DEMOCRACY 3 (Larry Diamond & Marc F.
Plattner, eds. 1996). Some scholars have attacked this brand of "orientalism" and have
accused East Asian authoritarian leaders of adopting it as a self-defining discourse. See
CHUA, supra note 122, at 159; Francis Fukuyama, Confucianism and Democracy, 6 J.
DEMOCRACY 20 (1995).
142. The prototype Asian authoritarian developmental model is usually characterized
by a tripartite framework of a highly autonomous technocratic bureaucracy, a politically
authoritarian regime or ruling party, and a connected or compliant business elite. See
PETER EVANS, EMBEDDED AUTONOMY: STATES AND INDUSTRIAL TRANSFORMATION 12
(1995); CHALMERS JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE: THE GROWTH OF
INDUSTRIAL POLICY, 1925-1975 17-23 (1982); ROBERT WADE, GOVERNING THE MARKET:
ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN EAST ASIAN INDUSTRIALIZATION 26-
29 (1990).
143. See Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in
the Newly Industrializing Countries 9-22 (1990).
144. See STEPHEN CHIU, THE POLITICS OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE: HONG KONG'S STRATEGY OF
INDUSTRIALIZATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 7-8 (1994); HAGGARD, supra note 143. at
25-27. A recent study characterizes the role of government in the Hong Kong model as
one of positive non-intervention: "The clear separation in Hong Kong between the role of
government as referee, and the role of private companies as active players in the econ-
omy, is unique in Asia, and rare world-wide." MICHAEL J. ENRIGHT ET AL., THE HONG
KONG ADVANTAGE 30 (1997).
145. Id. at 29-32.
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discovered that their success has produced more demands for represen-
tation of diverse social interests, inspiring political reforms; at the same
time, the increased costs of production and the globalization of the
economy have required Asian companies to compete with each other on
a global scale. 146 Many blame the East Asian economic crisis beginning
in late 1997 on the business/government alliance evident in this East
Asian developmental model, a model which is said to have spawned
what many now call crony capitalism. 147 The critical point here is the
increased recognition of the pernicious qualities inherent in business
decisions made in such incestuous ways. In the face of these develop-
ments, the rolling back of civil liberties in Hong Kong becomes merely a
poorly disguised attempt to control political opposition. So-called
authoritarian Asian political values have no role to play in contempo-
rary Hong Kong. Any attempt to stifle freedom and access to informa-
tion in Hong Kong would be a retrograde step detrimental to Hong
Kong's competitiveness.
IV. SUSTAINING HONG KONG'S AUTONOMY
In addition to the difficulties relating to the competing paradigm
discussed in the previous section, Hong Kong's status as an HKSAR in
China presents problems of sustaining its autonomy on both domestic
and international levels. The two sections in this part address respec-
tively Hong Kong's domestic and international autonomy. This analysis
raises several serious implications for Hong Kong's constitutional order,
including maintenance of democracy, human rights and the rule of law.
Under the "one country, two systems" formula, in the face of a dramati-
cally contrasting mainland system, autonomy is the key tW the success
of the Hong Kong model. On the domestic level, the absence of true
autonomy will result in the undermining of Hong Kong's constitutional
and human rights regime, a dramatic increase in corruption and the
full integration of Hong Kong into the mainland system. This repre-
sents a serious threat to both Hong Kong's way of life and its livelihood.
This threat may disadvantage both Hong Kong and China. On an in-
ternational level, true autonomy can be the source of investor confi-
dence in Hong Kong and empowerment in Hong Kong's international
affairs and its relationship with the mainland.
146. See Michael C. Davis, The Price of Rights: Constitutionalism and East Asian
Economic Development, 20 HuM. RTs. Q. 303, 303-37 (1998). Dietrich Rueschemeyer and
colleagues have described the ways that economic development transforms societies and
creates needs for diverse representation. DIETRICH RUESCHEMEYER ET AL., CAPITALIST
DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRACY (1992).
147. See David E. Sanger, Bailout Time: The Stock of 'Asian Values' Drops, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 23, 1997, at §4, p. 1. See also Donald K. Emmerson, Americanizing Asia?,
FOREIGN AFF., May/June 1998, at 46.
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A. Establishing Domestic Autonomy
It is sometimes useful to think of Hong Kong's late colonial consti-
tutional and human rights order in terms of a tripartite framework. 148
One may visualize this as an inverted triangle with Britain and China
represented by the vertices on the top and the Hong Kong community
the vertex on the bottom. Political discourse along any boundary or
axis has often been related to activities or the cessation of activities
along the other axes. During the late colonial period the people were not
confronted directly with Chinese rule, though the resumption of Chi-
nese sovereignty at some point in the future, as specified in the Joint
Declaration, represented the primary human rights concern. 149 Never-
theless, at various times, especially in the Basic Law drafting process in
the late 1980s, and in the late transition period in the mid-1990s, Hong
Kong people engaged in a direct human rights dialogue with Chinese
leaders. 150 At other times, especially during the post-1989 Tiananmen
crisis and in the 1992-94 debate over democratic reform, the Hong Kong
political and human rights culture was permitted to grow in an envi-
ronment largely sheltered from rather menacing Chinese government
actions. 151 There were similar hot and cold periods in the relations be-
tween the two governments. In spite of the increasing Chinese involve-
ment in Hong Kong affairs, pre-handover Hong Kong achieved a degree
of genuine autonomy. Before the handover, when conflicts arose there
was still the possibility of saying no to or resisting China's demands
over democracy, human rights and other issues that may arise.
This pre-1997 period also experienced an emerging dialogue be-
tween Hong Kong people, Britain and China, over the substantial
148. A detailed analysis of such tripartite framework is provided in a recent article.
Michael C. Davis, Human Rights and the Founding of the Hong Kong Special Administra-
tive Region: A Framework for Analysis, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 301 (1996).
149. Joint Declaration, supra note 1.
150. In the late 1980s the Basic Law drafting process was in full bloom and even the
leaders of the democracy movement participated in this more hopeful dialogue with
China. This largely came to an end with the development of the Tiananmen crisis. But,
again, in the immediate pre-handover period substantial numbers of business and pro-
China elite became party to China's second stove operations, which by 1996 had largely
displaced British policy machinery. NORMAN MINERS, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF
HONG KONG 14-42, 228-38 (5th ed. 1998).
151. After the Tiananmen massacre even Chinese contact with the substantial pro-
China community ground nearly to a halt, as the Basic Law process was itself suspended.
At this stage Britain began to question its earlier policy of accommodation; it then ad-
vanced initiatives on nationality and human rights, while still holding out on democracy.
Limited democracy became the subject of an agreement with China. Britain was more
forthcoming in its 1992 democracy initiative, and again a storm ensued, this time pro-
ducing polarization between the democratic and pro-China forces in Hong Kong. Id.
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mainland intrusion into Hong Kong affairs. The political establishment
in Beijing developed substantial formal mechanisms for monitoring de-
velopments in Hong Kong and reviewing the actions of the British Hong
Kong government. 15 2 The Beijing government demanded and seized
veto power over developments set to extend beyond the handover
date. 153 Large infrastructure projects, such as the airport and port fa-
cilities, required Beijing approval for financing. 54 China likewise de-
manded the same for political and legal developments that would ex-
tend beyond the handover date. 155 Due to the radically different
ideological perspectives of the parties, these developments, relating to
democracy, human rights and the court system, became the focus of al-
most all conflicts along all axes. 56 For any institutional change to be
allowed, they ultimately required China's approval. In response, Hong
Kong people either contested China's policies directly or pressured Brit-
ain to do so.1' 7 Yet all the while, moderate political reforms were al-
lowed to take place under the shelter of British rule, producing an evo-
lution of Hong Kong's political and legal skills, in the civil society, the
media and legal institutions. 158 On a structural level the tripartite
152. In Beijing the Hong Kong and Macau affairs office took primary responsibility
for Hong Kong Policy. In Hong Kong the local branch of the New China News Agency
served as China's representative in Hong Kong. After Governor Patten introduced his
election model for 1995, Xinhua and the Hong Kong and Macau affairs office seized every
opportunity to "undermine the authority and prestige of the government, and create un-
rest, in order to persuade Britain to recall Patten and appoint a more amenable Gover-
nor." MINERS, supra note 150, at 237. A Sino-British Joint Liaison Group (JLG) was es-
tablished for consultation over transition matters, as provided for in Annex II of the Joint
Declaration. In the Basic Law drafting process, there were the Basic Law Drafting and
Consultative Committees and, as the handover neared, the various Mainland transition
bodies noted above, emerged. The preliminary working committee, in particular, was set
up in 1993 to bypass the JLG altogether and prepare for the transition without British
and Democratic Hong Kong participation. Id. at 237-38.
153. Frank Ching, Toward Colonial Sunset, in PRECARIOUS BALANCE, supra note 23,
at 187-88. Britain and China disagreed over the purpose of the JLG, China arguing that
the Joint Declaration compelled Britain to use the JLG to obtain Chinese permission on
all important matters, effectively giving China veto power. MINERS, supra note 150, at
232.
154. Ching, supra note 153, at 187-88.
155. See Representative Government in Hong Kong, supra note 36; Ching, supra note
153, at 189-91; UK Accused of Breaching the Trust by Leaking Confidential Details, supra
note 36, at 12-13.
156. Ching, supra note 153, at 189-91.
157. After Britain caved in to Chinese demands that only one overseas judge sit on
the Court of Final Appeal, the newly elected Legislative Council voted to reject this pro-
posal. This was the first time that the Legislature opposed an agreement between Britain
and China involving Hong Kong. Id. After Chris Patten became Governor, the British
government became more responsive to Hong Kong concerns, resulting in the 1995 elec-
tion proposals that sped up the democratization time-table and increased local participa-
tion in government decisions. See MINERS, supra note 150, at 228-38. See also Davis, su-
pra note 148, at 310-11.
158. Most noteworthy in this regard were the 1991 and 1995 elections to the Legisla-
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framework grew to reflect aspects of the emerging constitutional char-
acter of this changing society.
At the same time, China learned to play the Hong Kong political
game, cultivating its own supporters to promote its preferred policies.
At the transition's end, in 1996-1997, through the complex system of
appointments to various mainland committees and previously discussed
rewards, China put in place a post-1997 political regime occupied al-
most entirely by its loyal lieutenants. This process began with drafting
the Basic Law, and reached its zenith in the late transition, by which
time the Hong Kong-British axis was almost entirely eclipsed by the
axis of discourse between China and its chosen Hong Kong supporters.
In the late transition stage China refused nearly all contact with electo-
rally popular democratic forces in Hong Kong. Upon the handover, the
Chinese government expelled remaining democratic forces in the Leg-
islative Council. Within the pro-China camp was a well worn path to
Beijing, as China focused on the minutia of the transition. For Hong
Kong's elite willing to play this game, Beijing was the venue for impor-
tant political and economic rewards.
The post-1997 period shows a confrontation between two forms of
power: the forces of a liberal democratic society and the forces of power
and influence achieved through the national regime. Both power
sources have enjoyed some success. Hong Kong decision-makers ignore
both popular opinion and powerful Beijing connected business interests
at their peril. In many respects, some success in both aspects suggests
the tripartite relationship that developed during the transition period
will likely continue as the fundamental character of Hong Kong's con-
stitutional politics. Britain's position in the pre-handover triadic rela-
tionship is being taken up by a partially responsive Hong Kong gov-
ernment and the pre-handover Hong Kong vertex occupied by an
emergent civil society. This tripartite structure is not as attractive as
true autonomy in Hong Kong, but it is more attractive than direct Bei-
jing rule. With a substantial level of political and economic development
already achieved in Hong Kong, any attempt to rule too closely by Bei-
jing would almost certainly be noticed and invite strong public protest.
The maintenance of tight control requires heavy-handed tactics and
Hong Kong would almost certainly be destroyed in the ensuing conflict.
Even a looser attempt by Beijing to control outcomes in Hong Kong,
perhaps under a de facto tripartite model, invites erosion of Hong
Kong's distinct character. Through interfering too readily in Hong
tive Council and the 1991 passage of the Bill of Rights Ordinance, bringing in an era of
active public debate on politics and human rights. Political, educational, legal and media
institutions have developed in this vibrant environment, presenting political leaders who
have endeavored to roll back these developments with a formidable challenge. See
MINERS supra note 150, at 196-213, 256-60. See generally Ching, supra note 153. at 188-
89 (discussing the 1991 elections).
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Kong's domestic issues, Beijing may invite a corruption of Hong Kong's
political and economic systems, and an intrusion by the mainland's sys-
tem into Hong Kong. Any attempts by either locally influential people
or highly placed mainland officials to cut around local political decisions
will directly corrupt Hong Kong's political and constitutional systems.
This would create a system where cultivating influence in Beijing will
be important, and invite further corruption. Mainland institutions that
offer avenues to invite intrusion by Beijing leaders include Hong Kong's
appointed delegations to China's NPC and CPPCC, the Basic Law
Committee (especially local members), the local branch of the New
China News Agency (an agency which historically has been China's de
facto embassy in Hong Kong), Beijing's Hong Kong and Macao Affairs
Office, the newly instituted branch office of the Mainland Foreign Min-
istry in Hong Kong, the local People's Liberation Army Garrison Com-
mand, and the local underground cell of the mainland Chinese Commu-
nist Party. 5 9 Perhaps the most important channel is through the Hong
Kong elite that can directly approach mainland leaders. 160 Democratic
processes and openness are the only reliable security for local auton-
omy.
In the initial phase of the HKSAR there was a noticeable diminu-
tion in mainland public official comment on Hong Kong. It is not clear
whether mainland interference diminished or went behind closed doors,
given that mainland chosen local officials are now in place. 16 1 It is clear
that China's locally appointed business and pro-China leaders and offi-
159. The local cell of the Chinese Communist Party has historically been the Hong
Kong Macao Work Committee, but recent rumors suggest this committee may be replaced
by the Party Organization of Hong Kong-Based Chinese Enterprises. Willy Wo-Lap Lam
Cadres and Tycoons Jockey for Position, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 30, 1997, at 17.
160. In this regard several examples of such influence are evident in local developer
Li Ka Shing going directly to Beijing to get a mainland prosecution in the Big Spender
case; local complaints regarding the local public broadcaster RTHKs criticisms of gov-
ernment policy made by Local NPC delegate Xu Simin; and local Basic Law Committee
member Raymond Wu attacking the recent landmark Court of Final Appeal judgment
(encouraging Beijing to overturn it). See Linda Choy, Xu's Attack on RTHK Dismissed:
Local Delegates Told CPPCC Has No Role in SAR, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 8, 1998,
at 4; No Kwai-Yan, Beijing Adviser Rejects Calls for His Resignation, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Feb. 5, 1999, at 4; Willy Wo-Lap Lam, Beijing's Answer to Tycoon's Lament, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 6, 1999, at 15.
161. There were some attempts by local NPC deputies (who, by virtue of their ap-
pointment process, tend to be pro-China business elite) to have a direct role in the
HKSAR but these were seemingly rebuffed by Beijing. Linda Choy, NPC Deputies Want to
Give Tung Views on Policy, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 6, 1998, at 2; No Kwai-Yan,
'Keep Quiet' Call to Local NPC Deputies, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 11, 1999, at 4.
Others have accused local officials of attempting to "second-guess" Beijing. Stella Lee, Of-
ficials 'Second-guess' Beijing, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 30, 1998, at 6. The Chief
Secretary Anson Chan was once quoted as saying that Beijing officials give policy hints,
but this was later denied. Genevieve Ku, Beijing May Have Given Policy Hints, Says An-
son, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 18, 1998, at 4; Genevieve Ku & Jimmy Cheung, Anson
Denies Job Hints From Beijing, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 19, 1998, at 4.
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cials offer little challenge to well-known mainland policies, leaving
mainland officials with little reason to openly interfere. These local
leaders appear very accommodating of favored mainland policies, to the
extent of sometimes exceeding the conservative policies of mainland of-
ficials. The example of local NPC Deputy Xu Simin's comments about
RTHK's failure to support the HKSAR and Chinese governments is a
case in point, where even the mainland officials seemed disapproving of
Mr. Xu's conservative position.
162
Recent examples of seeming favoritism toward mainland entities
and pro-China figures from within the HKSAR government include the
failure of Hong Kong's Department of Justice to prosecute the New
China News Agency for violating privacy laws and the failure to prose-
cute a leading pro-China publisher for distorting circulation figures,
though she was charged as an unindicted co-conspirator with three of
her prosecuted colleagues. 163 If allegations of favoritism were substanti-
ated, this calls into question the degree of autonomy from mainland in-
fluence, and, as discussed above, delivers a severe blow to popular con-
ceptions of human rights and the rule of law in Hong Kong. To their
credit, mainland officials have often reiterated that Hong Kong issues
are for Hong Kong officials to determine. 164 It is not clear whether this
attitude will persist as the democratization process proceeds and Hong
Kong officials are under more severe pressure to be less accommodat-
ing.165
Another possible source of corruption and threat to liberty and
property interests could arise from the large mainland business contin-
gency in Hong Kong. The perception that mainland companies are fully
subject to local autonomy and laws, and that local officials are fully
committed to enforcing such laws, is vital to Hong Kong's future. The
improper offering or withholding of business privileges on the mainland
should also be of concern to mainland officials. Local companies relin-
162. See Linda Choy, Xu's Attack on RTHK Dismissed Local Delegates Told CPPCC
Has No Role in SAR, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 8, 1998, at 4.
163. Fear of One Law for Rich, One for Poor, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 19, 1998,
at 3; Row Over Aw Decision; Justice Boss Urged to Explain Why Publisher was not Prose-
cuted, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 19, 1998, at 1.
164. It is noteworthy that the mainland government has even attempted to rein in lo-
cal NPC Deputies, rejecting calls that they be given separate offices within the territory,
an arrangement which surely would have contributed to the establishment of a separate
power base. Linda Choy, Local NPC Base Ruled Out, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 4,
1998, at 4. See also Linda Choy, supra note 161.
165. Annexes I and II of the Basic Law allow for the possibility of reforming the
method for selection of the Chief Executive and Legislative Council in 2007, allowing for
the possibility of universal suffrage and full direct elections in geographical constituen-
cies. But since this requires the approval of two-thirds of the Legislative Council (which
at that stage will only have half of its members directly elected) and the Chief Executive,
it seems unlikely such reform will be approved if China and the pro-China camp fear a
loss of control. Basic Law, supra 2, at Annexes I and II.
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quishing substantial interest to mainland companies to gain favor
raises cause for concern in this latter regard. Without strict control,
mainland practices can intrude across the border and local attempts to
curry favor with powerful mainland investors could intrude upon free
market practices and decisions in Hong Kong. The ability of mainland
companies' to influence local markets is also of concern. Occasionally
stock market and property increases in Hong Kong are supported, in
part, by the perception that the mainland government is a quasi-
guarantor of sustained growth. The mainland government should
clearly recognize the local boundary and be reluctant to over-react to
every hiccup in Hong Kong markets.16 6 There should also be concern
over any reluctance of local business advisers to offend prominent
mainland companies. 167 This phenomenon raises important liberty is-
sues for business advisors and the related media. Overall, the security
of property rights is at stake if mainland companies are allowed to
avoid the same legal standards as others, and flex their muscles in the
local economy. Though the attempt was later abandoned, a group of
mainland enterprises attempted to be assigned a functional constitu-
ency under the Electoral law that governed Hong Kong's 1998 election
for the Legislative Council.168 This open channel may have been prefer-
able to numerous possible back-door channels to power.
B. External Autonomy and the Global Process
A final concern when it comes to Hong Kong's autonomy and ulti-
mately the security of human rights and the rule of law is the preserva-
tion of Hong Kong's international status. Any properly constituted
community must have a fully recognizable external projection if it is to
survive. It has been argued in this regard that external effectiveness
translates into internal effectiveness. 69 As hinted by the previous sec-
tion, internal effectiveness also translates into external effectiveness.
The international community was told in the Joint Declaration that it
could rely on Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy when dealing with
Hong Kong. Any perception that Hong Kong is merely a front for the
Chinese government would destroy any confidence in this promise to
166. The East Asian economic crisis is believed to have spawned increased corruption,
such that the dangers of mainland companies under economic pressure being pulled into
corruption is realistic. Niall Fraser, 'Economic Turmoil to Blame' for Graft Surge, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, July 9, 1998, at 5.
167. There is some evidence that local investment advisors may shy away from criti-
cizing influential companies in an Asian environment where official approval is critical.
Mark Landler, Asian Dilemma: Can 'Guests'Advise?, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 12, 1999,
at 13.
168. Chris Yeung & Quinton Chan, Mainland-funded Firms Dropped Bid for New
Seat, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 7, 1998, at 8.
169. W. MICHAEL REISMAN, PUERTO RICO AND THE INTERNATIONAL PROCESS: NEW
ROLES IN ASSOCIATION 53-67 (1975).
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the fatal detriment of Hong Kong. The price for China of any confi-
dence in its commitments is to fully allow Hong Kong, without interfer-
ence, to conduct it internal affairs, as discussed above, and its external
relations, as discussed in this section. China's policies in this regard are
not without concern.
The Joint Declaration and the Basic Law are quite generous in
granting Hong Kong the right to conduct its own external affairs.1
70
The present essay need only highlight the contours of this authority.
While retaining control over Hong Kong's foreign and defense affairs
the mainland government has granted Hong Kong almost complete
autonomy in nearly all areas of external relations with respect to com-
mercial, cultural and social affairs.171 This includes the right to partici-
pate in most international organizations, with the proviso that if such
organization is confined to states then Hong Kong must participate as
part of the Chinese delegation. 172 Hong Kong has its own overseas
trade offices and may issue its own visas.173 It is also allowed to sign
international agreements on its own within the scope of these permitted
areas. 74 Again, China is required to assist Hong Kong in this regard
where necessary. On paper this is an extraordinary degree of autonomy
for a non-state community, but a degree that is essential to the kind of
constitutional community that Hong Kong is expected to be.
The present analysis of the tensions running through the Hong
Kong model concerns the degree of compliance. The above sections al-
ready consider the degree of compliance with the Joint Declaration on
the domestic front. The question for the present section is the degree of
external compliance or Hong Kong's degree of effectiveness in comply-
ing with it own commitments. In this regard, Hong Kong runs up
against some serious difficulties inherent in China's world view. There
seems little doubt that the current world order would generally be wel-
coming of an autonomous community like Hong Kong. Historically sta-
tist world views have generally given way to views that favor local self-
determination and participation by a wide range of territorial communi-
ties. Exclusive control by nation-states has generally given way to an
inclusive order regulating vast areas of human endeavor. 175 Hong Kong
already belongs to several international organizations and is party to
many international agreements.
76
170. Basic Law, supra note 2, at arts. 150-57.
171. Basic Law, supra note 2, at arts. 2, 13, 39, 114-18, 148-57; Joint declaration, su-
pra note 1, at art. 3(6)-(10), and Annex I arts, VI-IX.
172. Basic Law, supra note 2, at art. 152.
173. Id. at arts. 154-57.
174. Id. at arts. 151 and 153.
175. See Myres McDougal et al., The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Deci-
sion, in MYRES McDOUGAL & W. MICHAEL REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS 191
(1981).
176. As of early 1996, the Joint-Liaison Group, which under the Joint Declaration co-
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The problem for Hong Kong is that China's world view has been far
less accommodating of flexible approaches to sovereignty. Under nine-
teenth century views of sovereignty China has been more likely to ad-
monish others to not meddle in its internal affairs and has specifically
taken the view that both its human rights practices and Hong Kong are
internal affairs. 177 This legal positivist view may be further colored by a
nationalistic view that the world is out to contain China; of particular
concern in the present context is China's concern that Hong Kong not be
employed in the service of this containment. 178 In this regard, sustain-
ing real autonomy for non-nationalistic Hong Kong may be the best
strategic option. Such seems preferable to a less autonomous Hong
Kong which would have incentives of its own to meddle in China's af-
fairs and would, at the same time, be a subject of suspicion regarding
foreign meddling. Any attempt to disempower Hong Kong internation-
ally is clearly contrary to the Joint Declaration and the expectation of
international reliance on Hong Kong's autonomy.
In addition to the formal channels offered to territorial communi-
ties. The other channel, beyond the exclusive control of nation-states,
increasingly available to international actors, is what is now referred to
as the global order. Globalization, the tendency to move areas of inter-
national power and effectiveness beyond state control, has opened up
vast areas of influence to non-state actors. This non-territorial global
space is concerned with a wide range of topics from human rights, in-
formation and the arts to science and business. In the commercial area
John Gerald Ruggie describes a world of "transnational microeconomic
links."179 As a non-state international commercial center Hong Kong is
a very effective player in this latter global space. However, global effec-
tiveness, while beyond state control, depends a great deal on territorial
communities to provide a hospitable environment for global actors.
18 0
ordinates transition matters between China and Britain, had already agreed on Hong
Kong's continued participation in thirty international organizations; others were antici-
pated. RODA MUSHKAT, ONE COUNTRY, TWO INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITIES: THE
CASE OF HONG KONG 6 (1997).
177. China's claims that, despite the Sino-British Joint Declaration, Hong Kong is
China's internal affairs have persisted after the handover. Glenn Schloss, West Warned to
Stop Meddling, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 1, 1997, at 4. An early twentieth century
case expresses this 19th century positivist view of sovereignty, arguing for the "principle
of the exclusive competence of the state in regard to its own territory in such a way to
make it the point of departure in settling most questions that concern international rela-
tions." Island of Palmas Case (United States v. Netherlands), 2 R.I.A.A. 829 (1928). A
month after the handover, China's Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in
Hong Kong, Ma Yuzhen, hit out at Britain's first six-monthly report on Hong Kong by
warning that Hong Kong was now an internal affair. Schloss, supra.
178. See SAMUEL S. KIM, & LOWELL DITMER, CHINA'S QUEST FOR NATIONAL
IDENTITY 258 (1993).
179. John Gerard Ruggie, Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in In-
ternational Business, 47 INT'L ORG. 139 (1993).
180. See Davis, supra note 146, at 303-37.
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Communities which provide democratic processes, human rights and
the rule of law are more likely to attract global commercial and other
activities.18 1 Such communities, in the present world, are also likely to
provide a better quality of life and a wealthier environment for their in-
habitants. 182 Hong Kong is such a community, and as a global city, has
served as a conduit for vast amounts of mainland Chinese business that
seeks participation in this global economy. 183 In this regard, destroying
Hong Kong's autonomy and constitutional order would operate to de-
stroy Hong Kong as a venue for global enterprise. Destroying Hong
Kong as such a venue would be a great detriment to both China and
Hong Kong. Even the leader of the largest mainland enterprise in Hong
Kong, Larry Yung, argued that the mainland government must not in-
terfere with Hong Kong's autonomy or its rule of law, that to do so
would destroy Hong Kong.1
84
V. CONCLUSION
This article described a new type of territorial community for which
the assurances of constitutional order and human rights are vital. The
analysis seeks to contextualize human rights in the processes of com-
munity construction and survival. Autonomous functioning is vital to
these processes. Smaller territorial communities, including nation-
states, in a world marked by a rapidly expanding international order
and globalization, are constantly called upon to defend their autonomy
and political integrity, while pursuing greater integration in the wider
global order. The Hong Kong case of a highly autonomous community
within a much larger and more powerful state highlights the complexity
of this effort. In the context of Hong Kong, it is important to see that
constitutionalism and human rights are both constructive of and de-
pendent on autonomy, both domestic and external. In focusing our at-
tention on competing concerns surrounding constitutional developments
prior to the handover and during the first two years of the HKSAR this
paper seeks to highlight the complex tensions inherent in this constitu-
tional process and the attendant risks of failure.
In the face of China's contrarian system, protection of Hong Kong
people's liberty, human rights and way of life, as valuable ends in
themselves, is dependent on political will, both in terms of ideological
181. Id.
182. See GERALD W. SCULLY, CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTS AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH 12-14, 183-84 (1992); Adam Przeworski, et al., What Makes Democracies En-
dure?, 7 J. DEMOCRACY 1, 39-55 (1996).
183. See ENRIGHT, ET AL., supra note 144, at 53-83; Yue-Man Yeung and Fu-Chen Lo,
Global Restructuring and Emerging Urban Corridors in Pacific Asia, in EMERGING
WORLD CITIES IN PACIFIC ASIA 17-47 (Yue-Man Yeung and Fu-Chen Lo, eds., 1996).
184. Larry Yung, et al., Risk, Guanxi and 40% Luck-An Interview With CITIC Pa-
cific Chief Larry Yung, TIME, June 30, 1997, at 22-23.
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aspirations and in respect of autonomous space. With respect to Hong
Kong's role in China, three prominent hazards are identified and ad-
dressed with the following conclusions: (1) the attempted Singaporeani-
zation of Hong Kong, with the attendant loss of liberty and rights,
would likely lead to serious diminution in the entrepreneurial effective-
ness of Hong Kong as a developed commercial center; (2) failure to re-
spect Hong Kong's autonomy within China and preserve its liberal con-
stitutional order will lead to the integration of Hong Kong into China's
under-developed economy, with the attendant risk of corruption, loss of
confidence and diminution of wealth to the detriment of both Hong
Kong and China; and (3) failure to respect Hong Kong's autonomy in ex-
ternal affairs will deprive it of the ability to confidently represent its
own interest in both formal international arenas and the global eco-
nomic space. As a consequence, any failure to fully comply with the
Joint Declaration's commitments to liberal constitutional government
and a high degree of autonomy in a generous spirit that is protective of
basic human rights and the rule of Law will result in a tragic loss to
both Hong Kong and China.
